Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 35

Issue 1

Article 5

January 2011

Settlement of International Disputes between Canada and the
USA
1979 Report (Annotated)

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj

Recommended Citation
1979 Report (Annotated), Settlement of International Disputes between Canada and the USA, 35 Can.-U.S.
L.J. 9 (2011)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol35/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law Journal by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
AND
CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION

SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BETWEEN
CANADA AND THE USA
Resolutions Adopted
By the American Bar Association on 15 August 1979
and
By the CanadianBarAssociation on 30 August 1979
with
Accompanying Reports and Recommendations
20 September 1979

10

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 35, Nos. 1 & 2]

Copyright 0 1979
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Catalogue Number 79-56149
ISBN Number 0-89707-015-1

ABA & CBA--Settlement ofInternationalDisputes Between Canadaand the USA

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE

12

1. Resolution of the American Bar Association

13

2. Resolution of the Canadian Bar Association

14

3. [French portion of the Settlement of Disputes Between Canada
and USA omitted]
15
4. Draft Treaty on a Regime of Equal Access and Remedy in Cases
of Transfrontier Pollution
16
5. [French portion of the Settlement of Disputes Between Canada
and USA omitted]
20
6. Draft Treaty on a Third-Party Settlement of Disputes

21

7. [French portion of the Settlement of Disputes Between Canada
and USA omitted]
29
8. Report to the Executive and to the 1979 Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Bar Association
30
9. Report to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association by the Section of International Law
36
10. Report and Recommendations of the American and Canadian Bar
Associations Joint Working Group on the Settlement of International Disputes
40

12

CANADA-UNITED STATESLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 35, Nos. 1 & 2]

PREFACE
On 15 and 30 August, respectively, the American and Canadian Bar
Associations took a historic step, approving and recommending to the
attention of the Canadian and the United States Governments, as possible
basis for negotiation, two important documents:
(a) a draft treaty on a regime of equal access and remedy in cases of transfrontier pollution between Canada
and the United States; and
(b) a draft treaty on third party settlement of disputes relating primarily to the interpretation, application or operation of any treaty in force between Canada and the
United States.
This volume contains the English [...] texts of the two resolutions and
the two treatises, the special report presented to the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association by that Association's Section of International Law, and, last but not least, the extensive report of the Joint
Working Group on the Settlement of International Disputes, which for
several years has studied the subject and prepared by a truly joint effort
both the draft treatises and a commentary on them, together with a comprehensive survey of the many and varied disputes between the two
countries, of the means used for their settlement, and of the needs for the
improvement and reinforcement of existing procedures.
The two chairmen of the Working Group are grateful to the members
of the Group for their contributions to the final report and especially the
cooperative spirit in which they have worked, and to the two Associations and their officers for the constant support they have received in
completing this arduous but rewarding task.
Henry T. King, Jr.
T. Bradbrooke Smith, Q.C.
Co-Chairmen of the
Joint Working Group
on the Settlement of
International Disputes
American and Canadian
Bar Associations
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1. RESOLUTION
Adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association
at Dallas, Texas, on 15 August 1979.
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association commends to
the attention of the competent officials of the Government of the United
States, as possible bases for negotiation with the Government of Canada:
(a) the draft treaty on a regime of equal access and remedy in
cases of transfrontier pollution between the United States and
Canada; and
(b) the draft treaty on third party settlement of disputes relating
primarily to the interpretation, application, or operation of any
treaty in force between the United States and Canada, which are
contained in the Report of March 20, 1979 of the American and
Canadian Bar Associations Joint Working Group on the Settlement of International Disputes.
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2. RESOLUTION
Adopted by the Canadian Bar Association
at Calgary, Alberta, on 30 August 1979.
BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Canadian Bar Association commends
to the attention of the competent officials of the Government of Canada
as possible bases for negotiation with the Government of the United
States:
(a) the draft treaty on a regime of equal access and remedy in
cases of transfrontier pollution between the United States and
Canada; and
(b) the draft treaty on third party settlement of disputes relating
primarily to the interpretation, application, or operation of any
treaty in force between the United States and Canada,
which are contained in the Report of March 20, 1979 of the American
and Canadian Bar Association Joint Working Group on the Settlement of
International Disputes.
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4. DRAFT TREATY ON A REGIME OF EQUAL ACCESS
AND REMEDY IN CASES OF TRANSFRONTIER
POLLUTION
Article 1: Definitions
For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) "Pollution" means any introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substance or energy into the environment resulting
in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human
health, harm living resources or eco-systems, impair amenities
or interfere with other legitimate uses of the environment.'
(b) "Domestic pollution" means any intentional or unintentional pollution, the physical origin of which is situated wholly
within the area under the jurisdiction of one Party and which
has effects within that area only. 2
(c) "Transfrontier pollution" means any intentional or unintentional pollution whose physical origin is subject to, and situated wholly or in part within the area under the jurisdiction of
one Party and which has effects in the area under the jurisdiction of the other Party.3
(d) "Country of origin" means the Country within which, and
subject to the jurisdiction of which, transfrontier pollution
originates or could originate in connection with activities carried on or contemplated in that Country.4
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "pollution" as "the presence in the environment, or the introduction into it, of products of human activity which have harmful or
objectionable effects." While similar, the Treaty's definition is more specific in defining
the potential negative effects of pollution. "Pollution" is not defined in the Black's Law
Dictionary. See 7 J.A. SIMPSON & E.S.C. WEINER, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 43
(2d ed. 1989). See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004).
2 Neither The Oxford English Dictionary nor Black's Law Dictionary define "domestic pollution." See generally SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 1. See generally
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1.

3 Neither The Oxford English Dictionary nor Black's Law Dictionary define "transfrontier pollution." Id.
4 By contrast, the phrase "country of origin" in the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") context is used to refer to the cases where exported goods are
eligible for favorable tariff treatment because their country of origin is a signatory to the
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(e) "Exposed Country" means the Country affected by transfrontier pollution or exposed to a significant risk of transfrontier pollution.
(f) "Persons" means any natural or legal person, either private
or public. 6
Article 2: Rights of Persons Affected7
(a) The Country of origin shall ensure that any natural or legal
person resident in the exposed Country, who has suffered
transfrontier pollution damage or is exposed to a risk of transfrontier pollution, shall at least receive equivalent treatment to
that afforded in the Country of origin, in cases of domestic pollution or the risk thereof and in comparable circumstances, to
persons of equivalent condition or status resident in the Country of origin.
(b) From a procedural standpoint, this treatment shall include
but shall not be limited to the right to take part in, or have resort to, all administrative and judicial procedures existing within the Country of origin, in order to prevent domestic pollution,
to have it abated, and/or to obtain compensation for the damage caused.

Agreement. The requirements for such treatment are in the NAFTA's Rules of Origin.
See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 401-15, 1904, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
5 Neither The Oxford English Dictionary nor Black's Law Dictionary define "exposed country." See generally SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 1. See generally BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 1.
6 Black's Law Dictionary defines "person" as "a human being." Black's Law Dictionary defines a "legal person" under the term "artificial person" as "an entity, such as a
corporation created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human being; a
being, real or imaginary who for the purpose of legal reasoning is treated more or less as
a human being." BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY, supra note 1, at 1178.
7 Currently, the NAFTA prefers parties pursue private causes of action in environmental disputes. However, a party can appeal to "the Party's competent authorities to
investigate alleged violations of its environmental laws and regulations." The NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement emphasizes autonomy to national environmental laws
and regulations rather than using the agreement to create strong rights for individuals to
seek corrective action. See William D. Merritt, A PracticalGuide to Dispute Resolution
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 5 NAFTA L. & Bus. REv. AM. 169,
199-201 (1999).
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(c) In the case of requirements for security of cost, this treatment shall at least be equivalent to that accorded to a nonresident national of the Country of origin.
Article 3: Rights of Public and Private Organizations 8
(a)

(1) Where the domestic law of either Party or a political subdivision thereof permits persons who are resident or incorporated within its own territory, such as
environmental defense associations, to commence or
to participate in administrative and judicial procedures
to safeguard general environmental interests, that Party
or subdivision shall grant the same rights for comparable matters to similar persons resident or incorporated
in the territory of the other Party, provided that these
persons satisfy the conditions laid down for persons
resident or incorporated in the Country of origin.
(2) When some of the conditions concerning matters
of form laid down in the Country of origin cannot reasonably be imposed on persons resident or incorporated in the exposed Country, these latter should be entitled to commence proceedings in the Country of
origin if they satisfy comparable conditions.

(b) When the law of a Party or a political subdivision thereof
permits a public authority to participate in administrative or judicial procedures in order to safeguard general environmental interests, that Party shall provide competent public authorities of the
exposed Country with equivalent access to such procedures.
Article 4: Notice to Persons in the Exposed Country
(a) The Country of origin shall take any appropriate measures to
provide persons exposed to a significant risk of transfrontier pol8
The NAFTA grants symmetrical treatment of parties in both countries. However,
the NAFTA removes the parties' choice of forum by instituting review through binational
panels. Each nation retains its law and precedents, but either government can demand an
appeal to a binational panel. See Juscelino F. Colares & John W. Bohn, NAFTA 's Double StandardsofReview, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 199, 206 (2007).

ABA & CBA-Settlement ofInternationalDisputes Between Canadaand the USA

19

lution with notice sufficient in form and content to enable them to
exercise in a timely manner the rights referred to in this Treaty.
As far as possible, such notice should be at least equivalent to that
provided in the Country of origin in cases of comparable domestic pollution. It shall be sent also to any authority designated for
this purpose by the exposed Country.
(b) The exposed Country may designate one or more authorities
which will have the duty to receive and the responsibility to disseminate such notice within limits of time compatible with the
exercise of existing procedures in the Country of origin.
(c) Where such an authority has been designated, notification to
it shall constitute fulfillment of the obligation of the Country of
origin under paragraph (a). Failure of the exposed Country to
designate an authority under paragraph (b) in no way affects the
obligation of the Country of origin under paragraph (a).
Article 5: Limitation of Rights Granted
In no event shall the provisions of this Treaty be construed as granting, per se, any greater rights to persons resident or incorporated in the
exposed Country than those enjoyed by persons of equivalent condition
or status resident or incorporated in the Country of origin.

20
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6. DRAFT TREATY ON A THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES
Article 1: Compulsory Jurisdiction
In any dispute between the States Parties, any question of interpretation, application or operation of a treaty in force between them, which
has not been settled within a reasonable time by direct negotiations or
referred by agreement of the Parties to the International Court of Justice
or to some other third-party procedure, shall be submitted to third-party
settlement at the written request of either Party addressed to the other's
cabinet officer in charge of foreign affairs, or by an exchange of notes
between the two. 9
Article 2: Optional Jurisdiction
1. Any other dispute between the States and Parties relating to a
question or principle of international law may be submitted to
third-party settlement by special agreement between the Parties.
Without limiting the generality of this principle, the Parties regard
disputes concerning the following matters as particularly appropriate subjects for such special agreements:
a. pecuniary claims in respect of losses or damage sustained by one of the Parties or its nationals as a result of
acts or omissions of, or attributable to, the other Party;' 0
b. immunities of States and of their agencies and subdivisions;"
9 The NAFTA Chapter 20 contains the primary dispute resolution mechanism with
two exceptions: antidumping and countervailing duties. Chapter 19 covers these disputes. Alleged breaches of the NAFTA provisions follow a three step resolution process:
(1) consultations between parties; (2) if consolations fail, a meeting of the Free Trade
Commission; and (3) if the meeting of the Free Trade Commission fails, formation of an
arbitral panel. See Merritt, supra note 7, at 181.
10 This is a non-exhaustive list that was included to provide examples of disputes
commonly submitted for international arbitration. Additionally, this area of law is relatively well established and can be readily applied. See generally American Bar Assn. &
Canadian Bar Assn., Reports and Recommendations of the American and CanadianBar
Associations Joint Working Group on the Settlement ofInternationalDisputes, 22 INT'L
LAW. 879 (1988).

1 This is a non-exhaustive list that was included to provide examples of disputes
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c. privileges and immunities of Heads of States, Foreign
Ministers and other high officials;12
d. consular privileges and immunities;
e. treatment of the other Party's nationals;14
f. environmental issues;' 5
g. the management of natural resources of common interest; and
h. transnational application of civil and criminal laws.
2. The special agreements referred to in the previous paragraph
shall, for each case or group of cases, become effective through
an exchange of diplomatic notes without any legislative action. 8

commonly submitted for international arbitration. Additionally, this area of law is relatively well established and can be readily applied. Id.
12 This is a non-exhaustive list that was included to provide
examples of disputes
commonly submitted for international arbitration. Additionally, this area of law is relatively well established and can be readily applied. Id.
13 This is a non-exhaustive list that was included to provide
examples of disputes
commonly submitted for international arbitration. Additionally, this area of law is relatively well established and can be readily applied. Id.
14 This is a non-exhaustive list that was included to provide examples of disputes
commonly submitted for international arbitration. Additionally, this area of law is relatively well established and can be readily applied. Id.
15 This is a non-exhaustive list that was included to provide examples of disputes
commonly submitted for international arbitration. Additionally, this area of law is relatively well established and can be readily applied. Id.
16 Parties in dispute often need the support of a third party in facilitating the conflict
management process when they have become caught up in their differences and are no
longer able to find constructive ways to move forward. See generallyAntonia Engel &
Benedikt Korf, Negotiationand Mediation Techniquesfor NaturalResource Management, FAO, 2005, at 73, availableat
http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0O32e/a0032e06.htm.
Agreement to settle disputes by various forms of third-party resolution makes possible international agreement and international contracts to which the parties would not
otherwise agree. See generally Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND
VALuE 56 (1995).
18 Because in international law a diplomatic note was regarded as binding on the state
that issued it, a legislative action is unnecessary. It is becoming more necessary and
possible for popular participation in foreign policy making. However, when policies
regarding national security are involved, if we still call for democratizing American foreign policy, public opinions may rule out many traditional war-planning and war-
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Article 3: Organization of Third-Party Settlement
Unless the Parties otherwise agree in a particular case, third-party
settlement pursuant to Article 1 or Article 2 above shall be organized in
each case as follows:
(a) Within 60 days either of the receipt by the other Party of the
request for third-party settlement or of the date of signature of a
special agreement, as the case may be, each of the Parties shall
appoint one member of the arbitral tribunal. Within a further period of 60 days the Parties shall, by common agreement, select a
third person who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. Within
further period of 60 days the Parties shall, by common agreement,
select a third person who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. If
no agreement is reached on the selection of a Chairman within
this period, either Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make the appointment. If the latter is
prevented from acting or is a national of one of the Parties, the
nomination shall be made by the Vice-President of the Court. If
the latter is prevented from acting or is a national of one of the
Parties, the appointment shall be made by the senior judge of the
Court who is not a national of either Party. The time limits specified in this paragraph may be extended or shortened by agreement
of the Parties. 19
(b) If, for any reason, a tribunal is not constituted pursuant to the
previous paragraph within 120 days of the receipt of the request
for arbitration or of the date of signature of the arbitral agreement,
either Party may, by written application submit the dispute to the
International Court of Justice, to be decided by a Chamber thereof
composed in accordance with the following paragraph. The acceptance by the Parties of the jurisdiction of the Court and its

prevention strategies. See generally Cageprisoners.com, Court Can Rely on Diplomatic
Note From U.S. Embassy, www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=17814 (last visited
Apr. 14, 2009); see also Alan Tonelson, Diplomacy vs. Democracy,
http://www.nytimes.con/1990/02/04/books/diplomacy-vsdemocracy.html?pagewanted=1 (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
1 Under the NAFTA, if the Commission has convened and the matter has not been
resolved within thirty days or the time period to which the Parties agree, then "any consulting party may request in writing the establishment of an arbitral panel." Once it receives this request, the Commission will establish this panel. NAFTA, supra note 4, art.
2008.

24

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 35, Nos. 1 & 2]

special Chamber is subject to the condition that the Chamber has
been established in accordance with that paragraph.20
(c) The Parties agree that either of them will be authorized to request, at the time submitting a dispute to the Court, that the Court
form a Chamber for consideration of the case pursuant to Article
26(2) of the Court's Statute and Articles 17 and 18 of its Rules,
consisting of three judges, one national of Canada, one of the
United States, and one of another State to be agreed upon by the
Parties. If, at the time of application, one of the States Parties
does not have a national on the Court, it shall, pursuant to Article
31(2) of the Court's Statute, nominate a person to sit as judge. If
there is no agreement between the Parties on the third member of
the Chamber within 30 days of the submission to the Court of an
application pursuant to the previous paragraph, or if a Party with
no national on the Court does not nominate a person to sit as
judge within such time, that member or those members shall be
elected by the Court from among its members. In any such case
the Parties may jointly request that any election be made from
among judges coming from a particular geogra hical region or
representing a particular legal system or tradition. '
(d) Vacancies which may occur in an arbitral tribunal composed
according to paragraph (a) above shall be filled in such manner as
provided for original appointments. Vacancies occurring in the
Chamber of the Court established pursuant to paragraphs (b) and
(c) above shall be filled in accordance with the Statute and Rules
of the Court.22

20 Under the NAFTA, when the Parties receive the panel's final
report, they shall
agree to the resolution of their dispute and report this decision to their Sections of the
Secretariat. Id art. 2018.
21 The disputing Parties shall agree on the chair of the panel, but if they are unable to
agree, the Party chosen by a lot will choose the chair. If there are two Parties, then each
Party will pick two panel members who are citizens of the other Party. If there are more
than two Parties, then the Party complained against selects two panelists and the complaining Parties select the other two panelists. Id. art. 2011.
22 Unlike the Settlement of International Disputes, Article 1,124 of the NAFTA provides that in the event of a vacancy, or when the Parties are unable to mutually agree on
an arbitrator, the Appointing Authority (International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) Secretary General) will choose arbitrators to complete the Tribunal.
See id. art. 1124.
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Article 4: Competence
1. The arbitral tribunal or the Chamber of the Court constituted
in accordance with Article 3 shall have jurisdiction in any questions or dispute submitted to it in accordance with the provisions
of this Treaty.
2. Any disagreement (a) as to whether such tribunal or Chamber
has jurisdiction under this Treaty or any agreement concluded
pursuant thereto, or (b) as to the extent of such jurisdiction, shall
be settled by the decision of that tribunal or Chamber.
Article 5: Provisional Measures
1. An arbitral tribunal which considers prima facie that it has jurisdiction under this Treaty or an agreement concluded pursuant
thereto shall have the power to prescribe, by order, any provisional measures which it considers appropriate to preserve the respective rights of the Parties pending final adjudication.
2. Such provisional measures may only be prescribed, modified
or revoked upon the request of a Party and after giving both an
opportunity to be heard.
3. Each order issued pursuant to the Article shall specify the time
during which it is to be in effect, which in no case shall be longer
than six months. Either Party may apply to the tribunal for renewal of an order issued pursuant to this Article.
4. Any order prescribing, modifying or revoking provisional
measures shall be notified forthwith to Parties who shall promptly
comply therewith.

25
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Article 6: Location of Proceedings 23
1. Arbitration proceedings commenced at the request of one Party shall take place in the capital of the other Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree.
2. Arbitration proceedings commenced by agreement of the Parties shall take place at a location determined either (a) by the Parties' agreement, or (b) in default thereof by the tribunal itself.
3. Where a dispute is submitted to a Chamber of the Court pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 3, the Parties may request
that the Chamber sit at the capital of one of the Parties.
4. The tribunal hearing a case may hold proceedings at locations
other than its principal seat as and when the circumstances of the
case make it desirable.
Article 7: Conduct of Proceedings
1. An arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with paragraph
(a) of Article 3 shall function in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure annexed to this Treaty, unless the Parties should otherwise agree.
2. At the request of a Party, the tribunal may call upon any agency, subdivision or national of either Party to appear to give evidence or testimony, provided that the tribunal may not hear or receive evidence or testimony pursuant to this paragraph without
the consent of the Party whose agency, subdivision or national is
being called.
3. A Chamber of the Court formed pursuant to paragraphs (b)
and (c) of Article 3 shall function in accordance with the applica-

23 The NAFTA differs from the Settlement of International
Disputes regarding the
location of the arbitration. The NAFTA Article 1130 provides that the main consideration when deciding location is whether or not one Party is a Party to the New York Convention. If they are a Party to the Convention, then the arbitration will be held in that
Party's territory. Id. art. 1130.
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ble provisions of the Statute and Rules of the Court, unless the
Parties should, by common agreement, request otherwise.
Article 8: Applicable Law2 4
1. In deciding any question or dispute submitted to it pursuant to
this Treaty, a tribunal or Chamber shall apply the principles and
rules of international law, especially as reflected in the treaties
and practice of Canada and of the United States, as well as other
relevant principles of substantive law in force in either of the two
countries, particularly those manifesting their common legal traditions.
2. If a case requires the application of the principles of substantive law in force in either of the two countries, but in the opinion
of the tribunal there exists such a divergence between the relevant
principles in force in Canada and in the United States that it is not
possible to make a final decision on that basis, the tribunal shall
apply such other common legal principles referred to in paragraph
I as it considers appropriate, having regard to the desire of the
Parties to reach a solution just to all interests concerned.
3. The Parties may agree on particular principles or rules to be
applied by the tribunal.
Article 9: Finality, Binding Force and Interpretation of Decisions2 5
1. Subject to Article 10, the decision of a tribunal or Chamber
rendered pursuant to this Treaty is final and binding, and shall be
complied with by both Parties. If the constitutional law of a Party
does not permit or only partly permits a Party's compliance with
the tribunal's decision, or if the necessary legislation has not been
24 A Tribunal established under Article 1131 of the NAFTA shall decide the issues in
dispute in accordance with the rules of the NAFTA and applicable rules of international
law. See id. art. 1131 (stating, a "tribunal established under this Section shall decide the
issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international
law.").
25 Unlike the Draft Treaty, the NAFTA decisions are not final and binding on the
Parties. Under the NAFTA, a five-member arbitral panel issues a final report. Upon
receipt of the report, the Parties determine a resolution which normally conforms, though
it is not required, to the panel's recommendations. There are, however, enforcement
measures, such as the suspension of benefits, to force the Parties to reach an agreement
following the panel's issuance of the report. See generally id.

28
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enacted, the Parties agree that the judgment of the tribunal shall
specify pecuniary or other equitable satisfaction for the injured
party.
2. In the event of disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the
decision, the tribunal or Chamber which rendered it shall construe
it upon the request of either Party.
3. The tribunal may, eitherproprio motu or on the request of one
or both of the Parties, correct any manifest technical or clerical
error in its judgment.
Article 10: Advisory Opinions
In any particular case, the Parties may agree that, instead of binding
judgment, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with paragraph
(a) of Article 3 should render an advisory opinion.
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8. REPORT TO THE EXECUTIVE AND TO THE 1979
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CANADIAN BAR
ASSOCIATION
JULY 1979
In 1975 and 1976, officers of The Canadian Bar Association were
approached by representatives of the American Bar Association for the
purpose of considering a proposal whereby the two associations would
take an initiative toward creating a legal structure for peace in the
world.2 6
The discussions resulted in a modified proposal, a demonstration research project on the matter of disputes settlement between the two countries. This project was to be carried out by the representatives of the
Section of International Law of the American Bar Association and representatives of the Constitutional and International Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association functioning as a joint working group.
This project was approved by the Executive of the Canadian Bar Association in December of 1976 and a modest budget was appropriated to
it. The Canadian members of the Joint Working Group were designated
as T. Bradbrooke Smith, Q.C., the then Chairman of the Constitutional
and International Law Section; Co-Chairman, Professor J.G. Castel of
Osgoode Hall Law School; and W.C. Graham, Q.C. with Professor
George Alexandrowicz of Queen's University as co-rapporteur. American members were Henry T. King, Jr., Co-Chairman; Gerald Aksen; Professor Don Wallace; and Arthur T. Downey with Professor Louis Sohn
of Harvard as co-rapporteur.
Following four lengthy meetings, the Joint Working Group distributed a draft report to a large number of interested persons for comment. It
was also the subject of a panel discussion at the Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Bar Association held in Halifax in August 1978. Reaction to
the report was actively sought and all responses were reviewed at a final
meeting of the Working Group early in 1979 following which the final
report, dated March 20, 1979, was prepared.
While the entire area of disputes between the two countries is canvassed in the Report, the Group decided to confine its substantive recThe Canada-United States relationship is such a valuable example of promoting
peace in the world because though the two countries may momentarily disagree on certain issues, they overcome these differences in recognition of the mutual interests that
unite them, which far outweigh any possible disagreement. See Canada and the United
States: No Two Nations Closer, http://www.canadaintemational.gc.ca/can-am/Closeretroites.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
26
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ommendations to two areas in respect of which it felt there was some real
prospect of early adoption. These areas are the equalization of rights and
remedies of private parties in both countries in relation to transfrontier
pollution and the arbitration of differences of a legal nature between the
two governments. For each, a draft treaty has been prepared that both
subsumes the issues involved and provides a possible basis for negotiation between Canada and the United States.
The thrust of the proposed transfrontier pollution regime is that persons in both countries should have equal access to judicial and administrative procedures for prevention of and compensation for pollution damage. It should not matter on which side of the border the polluter is located, where the person affected lives, or in which jurisdiction the judicial or administrative protection is available. What is being proposed
here is not a new legal system, but the adjustment of the two countries'
existing municipal legal systems to accommodate equally residents of
both in pollution matters. Moreover, the regime presented in the draft
articles would not alter substantive rights or obligations on either side of
the border; it would merely grant equal access to whatever procedures
and remedies exist in either country. Thus, if a North Dakotan has a
right of action for pollution prevention in a court somewhere in the United States, so should a Manitoban similarly affected, and vice versa.27
The Group took a great deal of its inspiration in preparing this portion of the report from the 1977 OECD recommendation for the "Implementation Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution."28 Both
Canada and the United States are members of OECD and should take the
lead in putting the Council's recommendation into practice. The Group
recognized the fact that there might be questions of detail and concerns
about the practicalities of implementation of this proposal in the two
federal systems. A number of suggestions were made as to how to resolve some of the problems and these are included in the text of Part III
of the Report.

The 1977 OECD recommendation document outlines many of the problems both
the United States and Canada will encounter in the implementation of equal judicial and
administrative access in transfrontier pollution matters. Among the recommendations,
most importantly, are general principles that facilitate interstate cooperation and compatibility in legislating policy. See infra Annex B.
28 It is efficient for the actual or potential victim to have a remedy
in a court that lies
in the country where the pollution originated. In addition, polluters will be held accountable for their actions because victims will have a right to legal action in their jurisdiction.
Cooperation in matters such as transfrontier pollution will lead to better diplomatic relations between the two countries and make it easier for the two nations to tackle future
problems in the years to come. Id.
27
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Part III of the Report contains suggested treaty articles which would
provide the framework necessary for the implementation of the suggested system. Article I defines the critical descriptive terms to be used in
the remainder of the treaty including "pollution," "domestic pollution,"
and "transfrontier pollution." Article 2 is the main operative provision of
the treaty. It ensures that the actual or potential victim of transfrontier
pollution will have a remedy in the courts of the country where the pollution originated, if a victim residing in that country would have had a
remedy in the case of domestic pollution. Article 3 enables public and
private environmental groups in one country to have the same right to
protect the general environmental interest of their country in the courts or
administrative proceedings of the other as comparable groups in the latter
have. Article 4 ensures that each party will have sufficient information
from the other so that the residents of the country affected by transfrontier pollution may make full and effective use of all remedies available
under the treaty.
In recommending this approach the Joint Working Group had in
mind the requirements of private parties and litigants. It should not be
necessary, and it is certainly not desirable, that the intercession of Governments be resorted to in cases of pollution damage. Bearing in mind
the similarities in the legal systems and in the approach taken by legislatures in relation to pollution, the Group regards this proposal as not only
just, but eminently practical. While the problems of implementation are
considerable, having in mind the federal systems, the goal is not by any
means out of reach.
The second proposed treaty reflects the view that a system for thirdparty settlement of legal disputes between the two Governments should
be established and maintained for use as and when required. The system
offered has the simplicity and flexibility of arbitration and the permanence and consistency of judicial settlement. It is custom-designed for
the legal backgrounds of our two countries and for their situation as
North American neighbors. Essentially, it is composed of a mechanism
to which either the United States or Canada could submit disputes arising
out of any question of the interpretation application or operation of a
treaty in force between them. This would be the main jurisdictional provision of the dispute settlement mechanism. The Group felt that such a
provision would strike a balance between giving to it at its inception a
strictly limited jurisdiction but yet providing it with a basic core of jurisdiction that would enable it to function from its inception.
As the Group had an optimistic view of its acceptance and use by
both countries, it was further provided that it should have a rather more
extended optional jurisdiction, based on the consent of the parties. The
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categories of appropriate subjects in respect to which parties could be
expected to use the dispute settlement mechanism are the following:
a. pecuniary claims in respect of losses or damage sustained by
one of the Parties or its nationals as a result of acts or omissions
of, or attributable to, the other Party;
b. immunities of States and of their agencies and subdivisions;
c. privileges and immunities of Heads of States, Foreign Ministers and other high officials;
d. consular privileges and immunities;
e. treatment of the other Party's nationals;
f. environmental issues;
g. the management of natural resources of common interest; and
h. transnational application of civil and criminal laws.
The mechanism for dispute settlement is a three-person arbitral tribunal. However, if the parties cannot agree on its constitution within 120
days, then the matter is referred to a special chamber of the ICJ. It is
hoped that the normal procedure will be the setting up of an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the wishes of the parties rather than the Chamber of the Court, which will only be used as a last resort. The Group has
also made suggestions for the procedure and the applicable law to be
used in such third-party dispute settlement procedures.
The main provisions of this treaty are as follows: Article I limits
compulsory jurisdiction to questions of interpretation, application, or
operation of a treaty in force between the two countries. Article 2 makes
it clear that all disputes not subject to such compulsory jurisdiction may
be submitted to third-party settlement only through an ad hoc agreement
of both countries and sets forth eight categories of disputes especially
appropriate for such special agreements. Article 3 provides the details of
the procedure for the constitution of a three-member arbitral tribunal or
for submission of a dispute to a special chamber of the International
Court of Justice. Article 4 enables an arbitral tribunal or judicial panel to
determine the scope of its jurisdiction. Article 5 discusses provisional
measures which may be prescribed by arbitral tribunals. Articles 6 and 7
deal with questions of applicable law. Article 9 specifies that parties
shall comply with the decisions rendered pursuant to this treaty. Article
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10 allows the tribunal to render an advisory opinion if the parties agree
thereto.
The proposed system establishes legal procedures to complement existing diplomatic and related procedures. Even though the preponderant
majority of cases are resolved by bilateral negotiations, the availability of
a third-party decision to the process is crucial. There are questions on
which the two States may reasonably disagree, and in which a genuine
reconciliation of legally supportable conflicting positions cannot be had
through negotiations because each side continues to maintain the legal
validity of its claim. At other times difficult and unsettling negotiations
do lead to a solution, but it may not be a genuine accommodation. Instead it can be merely a patching over of the fundamental disagreement,
or a solution based on political advantage or bargaining power.
In addition, negotiations cannot, by themselves, continue to constitute an adequate dispute settlement system for two countries with a relationship which continues to grow in extent and complexity. What has
worked reasonably well in the past may be inadequate in the future.
Third-party settlement can ensure that, in appropriate cases, issues are
kept self-contained and are dealt with on their own merits, without "linkage" to other bilateral issues. It, therefore, accommodates the widely
held view that in complex bilateral relations it may frequently be unwise
to "trade off" the interests of different groups and regions. Consequently, the proposed treaty suggests that where a dispute is a legal one or has
legal aspects, obligatory arbitration or adjudication may be the most efficient and equitable means of settlement. Where a dispute is wholly legal,
the prospect of compulsory arbitration encourages negotiators to find a
solution. Where a dispute is partially legal, arbitration of the legal questions can reduce the dimensions of the dispute and provide a framework
which will simplify resolution of the remaining issues.
Finally, it is believed that general compulsory jurisdiction is especially appropriate for Canada and the United States in large part because
their mutual treaties are many and varied. If arbitration or adjudication is
permitted to range over this entire field, the satisfaction which either
State may find in any particular decision will be balanced by success of
the other State in other decisions. The net result over a period of time
will then properly reflect the equality and fairness inherent in genuine
third-party proceedings. The automatic availability of third-party settlement should reduce tension and diminish frustration by assuring that a
genuine and impartial solution can be had if negotiations will not produce one.
In summary, the Group believes that the automatic availability of
third-party settlement will not create acrimony or mistrust. Rather it will
reduce tension and diminish frustration; it will assure that a genuine and
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impartial solution can be had if negotiations will not produce one. Because negotiations between the two States have been reasonably successful, the two Governments should have sufficient faith in the relationship
to be able to agree on a compulsory settlement regime. The members of
the Group feel that it is legitimate to hope that the Governments may, as
between themselves, have the same faith that they expect from their citizens. If any two States should be able to settle their legal disputes
through legal procedures, it is the United States and Canada.2 9
At the same time, in making these recommendations the Group emphasizes that the proposed arbitral/judicial system is not offered in opposition to or replacement of the present system of bilateral negotiations,
including use of the International Joint Commission; what is offered is
merely a supplement to the diplomatic relationship. Under the proposed
treaty, third-party settlement would be available only when all efforts at
negotiation had failed. The arbitral or judicial panel would not have jurisdiction until then; it would be obliged to dismiss a case brought
prematurely. And substantial international and municipal jurisprudence
would provide clear and certain guidance in the determination of whether
the obligation to negotiate fully and in good faith had been complied
with. Furthermore, the decision about when to move from the diplomatic
to the legal phase in any case would, by terms of the proposed text, be
left in the hands of the cabinet officers in charge of foreign affairs.
The Group recognizes that there are a number of issues currently
outstanding between the two countries, some of which are quite pressing
and difficult to resolve. Several of these are noted in Parts I and II of the
report. While it is tempting to seize the moment and offer its recommendations as the solution to these pending questions, the Group does not do
so. What the Group is suggesting is that the two Governments, in the
face of the demands of the day, set aside some time to consider a system
which might moderate those demands on some future day.
T. Bradbrooke Smith, Q.C.
Co-Chairman of the ABA/CBA Joint Working
Group on the Settlement of International Disputes

The United States and Canada enjoy an extensive trade relationship. The inevitable
disputes that arise from this relationship, in most instances, are adequately handled using
the dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in bilateral and multilateral agreements.
See generally Press Release, Cliff Snow, Prakash Narayanan & Andrew Thompson,
Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Emerging Issues in Trade Litigation Between Canada
and the United States (June 12, 2007), http://www.blakes.com/english/view disc.asp
?ID=1442 (concluding that joint reliance on diplomatically initiated rules-based systems
is healthy for the trade relationship between Canada and the United States).
29
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9. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION BY THE SECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
AUGUST 1979
In 1975 and 1976, officers of the Canadian Bar Association were approached by representatives of the American Bar Association for the
purpose of considering a proposal whereby the two associations would
take an initiative toward creating a legal structure for peace in the world.
The proposal for the project originated at a meeting of the leadership
of the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association
which was held in October 1974. After the discussions with representatives of the Canadian Bar Association, it was felt that the most practical
course of action would be a research project on the matter of dispute
settlement between the two countries to be carried out by a joint working
group composed of members of the two associations. The approval by
the Canadian Bar Association of this project was secured in December
1976.
The project has been a joint effort in the fullest sense of the word and
essentially a partnership between representatives of the two bar associations. Henry T. King, Jr., Gerald Aksen, Professor Don Wallace, Jr., and
Arthur T. Downey have represented the Section of International Law
with Professor Louis B. Sohn acting as U.S. rapporteur.
The Joint Working Group on the Settlement of International Disputes
held numerous meetings between December of 1976 and March of 1979.
In July 1978, a preliminary draft of the Group's report was sent for review to about 150 people and organizations in both countries. The
Group tried to canvass all those who might be interested in commenting
on the proposed recommendations in the report.
The entire area of disputes between the two countries was canvassed
in the report of March 20, 1979, which is referred to in the resolution.
However, the Group decided to confine its substantive recommendations
to two areas where it feels that new procedures ought to be considered.
These areas are the arbitration of differences of a legal nature between
the two Governments and the equalization of rights and remedies for
private parties from both countries in cases of transfrontier pollution.
For each area, the Group has prepared a draft treaty text which it offers
as a possible basis for negotiation between the two Governments.
The thrust of the draft treaty on transfrontier pollution is that persons
in both countries should have equal access to judicial and administrative
procedures for prevention of and compensation for pollution damage. It
should not matter on which side of the border the polluter is located,
where the person affected lives, or in which jurisdiction the judicial or
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administrative protection is sought. What is being proposed here is not a
new legal system, but the adjustment of the two countries' existing municipal legal systems to accommodate equally residents of both pollution
matters.
The substantive provisions of the treaty (the text of which is attached
hereto) are summarized as follows:
Article 1 defines the critical descriptive terms to be used in the remainder of the treaty including "pollution," "domestic pollution," and
"transfrontier pollution." Article 2 is the main operative provision of the
treaty. It ensures that the actual or potential victim of transfrontier pollution will have a remedy in the courts of the country where the pollution
originated, if a victim residing in that country would have had a remedy
in the case of domestic pollution. Article 3 enables public and private
environmental groups in one country to have the same right to protect the
general environmental interests of their country in the courts or administrative proceedings of the other as comparable groups in the latter have.
Article 4 ensures that each party will have sufficient information from
the other so that the residents of the country affected by transfrontier
pollution may make full and effective use of all remedies available under
the treaty. Article 5 is designed to ensure that the treaty does not inadvertently put the nationals of one State in a better position to enforce the
pollution laws of the other State than can be done by the citizens of that
other State.
The second proposed treaty reflects the view that a system for thirdparty settlement of legal disputes between the two Governments should
be established and maintained for use as and when required. The system
offered has the simplicity and flexibility of arbitration and the permanence and consistency of judicial settlement. It is custom-designed for
the legal backgrounds of our two countries, and for their situation as
North American neighbors.
The main provisions of this treaty are as follows: Article 1 limits
compulsory jurisdiction to questions of interpretation, application, or
operation of a treaty in force between the two countries. Article 2 makes
it clear that all disputes not subject to such compulsory jurisdiction may
be submitted to third-party settlement only through an ad hoc agreement
of both counties and sets forth eight categories of disputes especially
appropriate for such special agreements. Article 3 provides the details of
the procedure for the constitution of a three-member arbitral tribunal or
judicial panel to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. Article 5 discusses provisional measures which may be prescribed by arbitral tribunals. Articles 6 and 7 deal with location and conduct of arbitral proceedings. Article 8 deals with questions of applicable law. Article 9 specifies that parties shall comply with the decisions rendered pursuant to this
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treaty. Article 10 allows the tribunal to render an advisory opinion if the
parties agree thereto.
The proposed system establishes legal procedures to complement existing procedures. Even though the preponderant majority of cases are
resolved by bilateral negotiations, the availability of a third-party decision to the process is crucial.. There are questions on which the two
States may reasonably disagree, and in which a genuine reconciliation of
legally supportable conflicting positions cannot be had through negotiations since each side continues to maintain the legal validity of its claim.
At other times, difficult and unsettling negotiations do lead to a solution,
but it may not be a genuine accommodation. Instead, it can be merely a
patching over of the fundamental disagreement, or a solution based on
political advantage or bargaining power.
In addition, negotiations cannot, by themselves, continue to constitute an adequate dispute settlement system for two countries with a relationship which continues to grow in extent and complexity. What has
worked reasonably well in the past may be inadequate in the future.
Third-party settlement can ensure that, in appropriate cases, issues are
kept self-contained and are dealt with on their own merits, without "linkage" to other bilateral issues. It, therefore, accommodates the widely
held view that in complex bilateral relations it may frequently be unwise
to "trade off" the interests of different groups and regions. Consequently, the proposed treaty suggests that where a dispute is a legal one or has
legal aspects, obligatory arbitration or adjudication may be the most efficient and equitable means of settlement. Where a dispute is wholly legal,
the prospect of compulsory arbitration encourages negotiators to find a
solution. Where a dispute is partially legal, arbitration of the legal questions can reduce the dimensions of the dispute and provide a framework
which will simplify resolution of the remaining issues.
Finally, it is believed that general compulsory jurisdiction is especially appropriate for Canada and the United States in large part because
their mutual treaties are many and varied. If arbitration or adjudication is
permitted to range over this entire field, the satisfaction which either
State may find in any particular decision will be balanced by success of
the other State in other decisions. The net result over a period of time
will then properly reflect the equality and fairness inherent in genuine
third-party proceedings. The automatic availability of third-party settlement should reduce tension and diminish frustration by assuring that a
genuine and impartial solution can be had if negotiations will not produce one.
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CONCLUSION
The recommendation before the House of Delegates is the product of
a genuine effort of cooperation between the bar associations of the United States and Canada. The draft treaties, if they were to enter into force,
would greatly enhance relations between the United States and Canada.
Accordingly, the American Bar Association should adopt the recommendation and report.
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10. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN AND CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATIONS JOINT
WORKING GROUP ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
Committee Members:
American Bar Association:
Canadian Bar Association:
T. Bradbrooke Smith, Q. C.,
Henry T. King, Jr.,
Co-Chairman
Co-Chairman
Gerald Aksen
George Alexandrowicz,
Co-Rapporteur
Arthur T. Downey
Jean-Gabriel Castel
Louis B, Sohn,
Co-Rapporteur
W. C. Graham, Q.C.
Don Wallace, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
In 1975 and 1976, officers of the Canadian Bar Association were approached by representatives of the American Bar Association for the
purpose of considering a proposal whereby the two associations would
take an initiative toward creating a legal structure for peace in the world.
The proposal for the project originated at a meeting of the leadership
of the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association,
which was held in October 1974. After consultations, it was agreed that
it should be undertaken by the Section in conjunction with one or more
bar associations of other friendly countries. Precedents for this type of
cooperative effort included joint projects undertaken by the American
and Canadian Bar Associations during and just after World War II,
which influenced the drafting of the United Nations Charter and promoted U.S. acceptance of the International Court of Justice.
After the discussions with representatives of the Canadian Bar Association referred to, it was felt that the most practical course of action
would be a demonstration research project on the matter of dispute settlement between the two countries to be carried out by a joint working
group composed of members of the two associations. The approval by
the Canadian Bar Association of this was secured in December 1976.
The project has been a joint project in the fullest sense of the word
and essentially a partnership between representatives of the two bar associations. Henry T. King, Jr., Gerald Aksen, Professor Don Wallace, and
Arthur T. Downey have represented the Section of International Law
with Professor Louis B. Sohn acting as U.S. rapporteur. For the Canadian Bar Association, T. Bradbrooke Smith, Q.C., W.C. Graham, Q.C., and
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Professor J.G. Castel have been the designated representatives, with Professor George Alexandrowicz of Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario
acting as Canadian rapporteur.
The Group held two meetings in 1977: one at Harvard Law School in
May 1977 and the other at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto 1977.
In January 1978, the Group met at New York at the American Arbitration Association with Henry P. Smith, III, the then Chairman of the U.S.
Section of the International Joint Commission, and with other Representatives of that body to review its role in the disposition of issues between
the two countries relating to boundary waters. At a meeting held in May
1978 at the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto, the Group met
with Maxwell Cohen, Q.C., Chairman of the Canadian Section of the
International Joint Commission, to review further the work of the Commission.
At this point, a preliminary draft of the present report was prepared.
From the time it first became available in July 1978 to its final review by
the joint working group, it was sent for review to about 150 people and
organizations in both countries. The Group tried to canvass all those
who might be interested in commenting on the proposed recommendations of the report. It is obvious we may not have got the drafting into
the hands of everyone who might wish to comment and any oversight in
this regard should not be construed as a conscious decision by the Group,
but rather as a result of its members' lack of familiarity or contact with a
particular person or organization.
Some twenty of the persons polled were good enough to make detailed comments on the draft report. Their names are listed in an appendix to the present report. To them the Group gives its special thanks.30
At a meeting held in New York at the American Arbitration Association
in March 1979, the Group went over the draft, in light of these comments. Each and every comment was considered although not all produced changes in the text, as the Group decided in a number of cases to
hold to its original position. Nevertheless, many changes were made,
and in a few cases, these alterations were of a quite fundamental nature.
A perusal of the report and recommendations will indicate that the
entire area of disputes between the two countries was canvassed: historically, in terms of categories of disputes, and in terms of possible means
of settlement. A number of issues were explored upon which no substantive recommendation was made by the Working Group. They included:
dispute avoidance and prior consultation procedures, which the Group
The listing of these individuals does not denote their endorsement of the report or
any of its recommendations. Endorsements as such were not sought at this preliminary
stage of drafting.
30
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believes are essentially matters within the political and diplomatic domain; and the current and future role of the International Joint Commission, which the Group found to be a model of the effective use of a
mixed commission as a fact-finding and advisory adjunct to settlement
by negotiation. As to these subjects the Group's only recommendation is
a procedural one: further examination of these topics by competent officials in both countries.
The Group decided to confine its substantive recommendations to
two areas where it feels that new procedures ought to be considered.
These areas are the arbitration of differences of a legal nature between
the two Governments and the equalization of rights and remedies for
private parties from both countries in cases of transfrontier pollution.
For each area, the Group has prepared a draft treaty text which it offers
as a possible basis for negotiation between the two Governments.
The thrust of the proposed transfrontier pollution regime is that persons in both countries should have equal access to judicial and administrative procedures for prevention of and compensation for pollution damage. It should not matter on which side of the border the polluter is located, where the person affected lives, or in which jurisdiction the judicial or administrative protection is sought. What is being proposed here
is not a new legal system, but the adjustment of the two countries' existing municipal legal systems to accommodate equally residents of both in
pollution matters, the implementation of which we recognize can involve
difficulties.
Because the Group's proposal for an intergovernmental system of
third-party settlement may be more conventional, it is desirable that the
rationale for it be explained here. The main criticism of the proposal is
that it rests on principles inconsistent with the historic nature of the relations between the two Governments. Why, runs the argument, graft a
legal procedure onto a system of bilateral diplomatic and political negotiations that has worked so well? After a thorough reexamination of its
assumptions, the Group concludes that the system of arbitration and adjudication offered is more than fully consistent with the fundamentals of
the two Governments' present relationship; it will contribute to the completion of that relationship by involving into a defined area the precepts
of the rule of law on which the relationship is built.
The burden of the Group's proposal is that a system for third-party
settlement of legal disputes between the two Governments should be
established and kept in place for use as and when required. The system
offered has the simplicity and flexibility of arbitration and the permanence and consistency of judicial settlement. It is custom-designed for
the legal backgrounds of our two countries, and for their situation as
North American neighbors.
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That the proposed system involves legal procedures to complement
the structures in place should not surprise, the Group being representative of two bar associations and being composed entirely of lawyers. 3 1
We work in judicial systems. Despite weaknesses, we believe in the
basic utility of those systems. The availability of judicial recourse has
not resulted in a deterioration of day-to-day judicial relations domestically or in excessive litigiousness. Parties to a dispute, whether they be
private individuals, corporations, or governments normally prefer to settle a dispute rather than "go to court." Even within the context of litigation, the preponderant majority of cases are never tried; they are settled
between the litigants prior to trial. Nevertheless, the availability of a
third-party decision to the process is crucial. It provides a solution in
that small percentage of cases where mutual accommodation cannot be
had and forces accommodation in others by its very existence.
Further, there are questions on which, as with individuals, the two
States may reasonably disagree. Sometimes a genuine reconciliation of
legally supportable conflicting positions cannot be had through negotiations, and each side continues to emphasize the legal availability of its
claim. At other times, difficult and unsettling negotiations do lead to a
solution, but it may not be a genuine accommodation. Instead, it can be
merely a patching over of the fundamental disagreement, or a solution
based on political advantage or bargaining power.
Finally, negotiations cannot, by themselves, continue to constitute an
adequate dispute settlement system for two countries with a relationship
which continues to grow in extent and complexity. What has worked
reasonably well in the past may be inadequate in the future. Third-party
settlement can ensure that, in appropriate cases, issues are kept selfcontained and are dealt with on their own merits, without "linkage" to
other bilateral issues. It therefore accommodates the widely held view
that in complex bilateral relations it may frequently be unwise to "trade
off" the interests of different groups and regions.
In consequence, the Group has suggested that where a dispute is a
legal one or has legal aspects, obligatory arbitration or adjudication may
be the most efficient and equitable means of settlement. Where a dispute
is wholly legal, the prospect of compulsory arbitration encourages negotiators to find a solution. Where a dispute is partially legal, arbitration of
the legal questions can reduce the dimensions of the dispute and provide
31 In fact, recognition of its special competence led the Group to avoid making recommendations on non-legal matters. Therefore, although the Group viewed with great
interest the possibilities of prior consultation, legislative coordination, and increased use
of mixed commissions, it refrained, as noted above, from making any substantive recommendations in these areas.
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a framework which will simplify the resolution of the remaining issues.
The Group recognizes that in the abstract, the line between legal and
non-legal may be difficult to draw. However, whenever courts, including the International Court of Justice, have been faced with this problem,
they have always been able to make the distinction.
While the Group sees its proposal as framed and limited by the basic
pattern of negotiation, it does not pretend that it is suggesting a minor
improvement, a mere adjustment of the pattern. It recognizes that a genuine commitment to compulsory jurisdiction, even in an area as restricted
as treaty questions, is a departure. Notwithstanding the acceptance by
both States of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under
the Optional Clause of its Statute, and Article 10 of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909, neither these nor any of the other existing commitments
of the two Governments to each other amount to genuine compulsory
jurisdiction; all require an ad hoc, after-the-fact agreement to go to arbitration.
In this regard, it has also been suggested that a compulsory system is
superfluous because the two Governments have always found it easy to
agree ad hoc on an arbitral procedure when it was necessary. History
does not bear out this assertion. As noted, the two States have an extraordinarily multifaceted and intense relationship. The Group's survey
shows that there have been many disputes over the last eighty years. Yet
only four or five have gone to arbitration. Without reviewing the diplomatic history of the relationship, it may safely be stated that a number of
other disputes might have been referred to arbitration but for want of an
agreement to do so.
Finally, we feel that general compulsory jurisdiction is especially
appropriate for Canada and the United States in large part because their
mutual treaties are many and varied. If arbitration or adjudication is
permitted to range over this entire field, the favor which either State may
find in any particular decision will be balanced by favor to the other
State in other decisions. The net result over a period of time will then
properly reflect the equality and fairness inherent in genuine third-party
proceedings.
In summary, the Group believes that the automatic availability of
third-party settlement should not create acrimony or mistrust. Rather it
should reduce tension and diminish frustration by assuring that a genuine
and impartial solution can be had if negotiations will not produce one.
The members of the Group feel that it is legitimate to hope that the Governments may, as between themselves, have the same faith in the judicial
process as they expect from their citizens. If any two States should be
able to settle their legal disputes through legal procedures, it is the United States and Canada.

ABA & CBA-Settlement ofInternationalDisputes Between Canadaand the USA

45

As Co-Chairmen of the Working Group, we wish to thank all the
members for their active participation in its work. In addition, on behalf
of the Working Group we wish to express our thanks for financial assistance in the preparation of the report to TRW Foundation, K-Mart, the
Johnson Foundation, the A B Dick Co., and the International Peace
Academy which made available to the co-rapporteurs the invaluable assistance of Paul C. Irwin, the Ruth Forbes Young International Peace
Academy Fellow at the Harvard Law School. We extend special thanks
to our co-rapporteurs, Professors Alexandrowicz and Sohn, without
whose untiring efforts this report could not have been produced.
Henry T. King, Jr.,
Co-Chairman,

T. Bradbrooke Smith, Q.C.,
Co-Chairman.
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PART I. A SURVEY OF DISPUTES BETWEEN CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES
The 5000-mile boundary between the United States and Canada is
the longest between two States in the world. It was drawn originally
through uninhabited wilderness, and now much of it passes through the
middle of a highly industrialized metropolitan area. From the beginning,
there were problems about the actual location of the boundary lines, and
some of these problems have persisted to this very day. Most of the current problems relate, however, to the numerous economic, political, and
cultural activities which constantly cross or have effects across the
boundary lines, raising a variety ofjurisdictional issues.3 2 Because of the
many transnational links, what happens in one country is likely to affect
the other one, and very few matters are so domestic that they are of no
concern to the neighboring country. As the relationships are on many
levels, the disputes which have arisen are not purely intergovernmental
but have involved both local interests of various states and provinces and
claims of individuals and corporations.
The history of peaceful settlement in North America begins with
boundary delimitation. Periodically from 1794 to 1903, different portions of the common boundary were submitted to mixed commissions or
to arbitration. Several disputes over marine boundaries are still extant.
Ownership of Machias Seal Island and North Rock in the Gulf of Maine
is in question, and it was suggested in 1973 that the dispute be referred to
the International Court of Justice. Also unresolved is a dispute as to
whether a line drawn by a 1903 joint commission at the northern end of
the Dixon Entrance between Alaska and British Columbia separates only
land areas of the two countries or constitutes a maritime boundary. Canada has proposed that this matter be considered in the light of state practice of the two parties, as well as on the basis of international law as it
developed over the years. Canada and the United States also continue to
discuss questions relating to the delimitation of their continental shelf
boundaries.3 3 The marine boundaries in the Gulf of Maine, the Arctic,
32 In the wake of ongoing problems with the United States-Mexico border, the Obama
Administration is determined to treat the United States-Canada issues with the same
attentiveness because "you can't go light on one and heavy on the other." To the disappointment of many proponents of economic development, it appears political pressure is
forcing the Obama administration into supporting a border plan that will hamper trade
between Canada and the United States. See Janet Napolitano, U.S. Homeland Security
Secretary, Keynote Address at the Brookings Institute Conference: Toward a Better Border: The United States and Canada (Mar. 25, 2009) (transcript available at
htp://www.brookings.edu/events/2009/0325_uscanada.aspx).
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was completed and open for
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and the Pacific have not been definitively determined; nor has the
boundary in the Pacific, off the west coasts of the two countries.
These delimitation questions have become more complex in the last
couple of years because of declarations by the two countries of 200-mile
fishing zones, the boundaries of which overlap. Other disputes have
arisen with respect to particular fisheries practices. For instance, in
1975, as a result of United States court decisions relating to Indian fishing rights, the United States withdrew its approval of certain regulations
of the bilateral International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission.
Canada claimed that this action was not consistent with the terms of the
relevant convention. Since 1964, the drawing of various fishing lines by
Canada has led to United States protests.
These maritime boundaries and marine resources questions are not
likely to be resolved automatically by any convention which might come
out of the current United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The
recent Cadieux-Cutler negotiations have encountered great difficulties in
trying to settle both sets of problems.
Various economic, trade, and investment questions continue to arise
between the two countries. 34 Until World War II, these questions primarily related to import or export restrictions enacted by one country or the
other. A recent example of such a problem is the 1973 United States
imposition of countervailing duties on tire imports from Michelin plants
in Nova Scotia. Although no international determination of the point
was ever made, United States officials, relating their action to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, took the position that Canadian
federal and provincial subsidies to Michelin constituted "bounties" which
are "unfair practices" by the terms of United States tariff laws.
Since World War II, the principal mutual economic concerns of the
two States have been those relating to investment and other activities in

signature in 1982. The Convention contains 320 articles and 9 annexes, governing all
aspects of ocean space, such as delimitation, environmental control, marine scientific
research, economic and commercial activities, transfer of technology, and the settlement
of disputes relating to ocean matters. United Nations, United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Overview and Full Text, http://www.un.org/Depts
/los/convention agreements/conventionoverviewconvention.htm (last visited Aug. 15,
2009).
34 The NAFTA was created in 1994 to remove tariffs and trade barriers between the
United States, Canada, and Mexico; however, NAFTA may have created more questions
than answers. Some commentators suggest that NAFTA has had a negative effect on the
distribution of income, wealth, and political power within these countries. ROBERT E.
Scorr, CARLOS SALAS, & BRUCE CAMPBELL, REVISITING NAFTA: STILL NOT WORKING
FOR NORTH AMERICA'S WORKERS (2006), available at

http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bpl73/.
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Canada by United States-based corporations. A well-known example of
Canadian problems with such activities is the "auto pact" case.
The auto pact case began with the institution by Canada in 1962 and
1963 of a duty remission scheme to encourage United States car manufacturers to increase parts production and assembly in their Canadian
facilities. The United States Government, in response to a petition by a
private United States company, considered countervailing duties to raise
the cost of importing Canadian parts benefitting from these remissions.
Negotiations, begun under the auspices of the Joint Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, a cabinet-level body established in
1953, resulted in the conclusion in 1965 of the so-called Auto Pact, a
type of free trade agreement, in which Canada was guaranteed ratable
participation in increased production. The economic effects of the
agreement are debatable. The agreement continues in effect, although
demands have been made for its renegotiation.
Another example of a problem related to United States economic
presence in Canada is the "magazine tax" case. Since 1956, the Canadian Government has made various attempts to encourage advertising in
domestically-owned periodicals. In 1965, the Canadian business tax
deduction was eliminated for advertising in Canadian editions of Time
and Reader's Digest, which enjoyed a very high readership in Canada
and overshadowed Canadian competitors. An exemption from this legislation was later obtained as a result of United States governmental and
private representations, but when the exemption was tightened up in
1975, Time decided to discontinue its Canadian edition as it found it uneconomical to try to comply with the new conditions. Reader's Digest,
however, was able to qualify for the exemption. Somewhat similar problems have arisen in connection with Canadian advertising on United
States television programs broadcast over the border into Canada or rebroadcast by Canadian cable companies. Restrictions designed to discourage these practices were adopted by the Canadian Government; a
permanent solution satisfactory to both sides is still being sought. In these cases, the cultural impact of the United States activities may perhaps
have been as important as the economic considerations in determining
the Canadian response.
For the United States, private investment in Canada has been a
source of concern since the early 1960s when the United States balance
of payments position began to erode. An unexpected 1963 presidential
proposal for an interest equalization tax caused some difficulty in Canada
because it would have encouraged withdrawal of United States funds
from Canada. Arrangements were made for prior consultations in the
future, and as a result of such consultation an exemption for Canada was
built into United States payment guidelines promulgated in mid-1965.
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Lack of such consultations produced some problems later in 1965 and
again in 1968 when mandatory guidelines were imposed; a Canadian
exemption, however, was eventually negotiated. Canadian concern in
the last few years over the level of foreign investment led to the passage
of the Foreign Investment Review Act. At the moment, this provides for
the survey and assessment of foreign investment in Canada, and also for
limited federal control over new investment and over expatriation of the
benefits of such investment. The Canadian Government's efforts in this
direction are still in the tentative and experimental stage. While the legislation has been criticized as both too strong and as too weak, there has
been a widespread tendency to reserve judgment on it until practice and
policy develop further."
The two countries have become increasingly concerned with trade in
energy resources and energy policy. 36 In the late 1970s, oil transmission
was a significant problem. With natural gas, the changing supply situation is the principal difficulty. This was not always so. Throughout the
1950s and 1960s, United States oil producers pressed the federal government, successively, for guidelines, voluntary quotas, and, in 1959,
mandatory quotas on imports, invoking various national security
grounds. Canadian officials, with the de facto alliance of the so-called
"northern tier" United States refineries, successfully worked throughout
this period to maintain a preferential position for oil imports from Canada, including exemption from quotas. Natural gas imports are handled
by a licensing system administered through the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in the United States and the National Energy Board (NEB) in
Canada. Through the 1950s and 1960s, northern United States users
seeking long-term Canadian import contracts combined with Canadian
companies who sought market penetration. On the other hand, United
States producers, wishing to establish their own subsidiaries in Canada,
joined forces with the FPC, which was concerned about the uncertainty
of supplies controlled by Canadian companies.
In 1970, the positions of the two countries with respect to trade in
energy resources began to reverse. In that year, the NEB began for the
first time to limit licenses for export of natural gas. In 1973, the Minister
of Energy announced that both oil and gas exports would be restricted
through that winter, and an export tax was imposed. Friction over this
3 The NAFTA Chapter Eleven contains provisions protecting cross-border investors
through non-discrimination policies, such as national treatment and most favored nation.
See generally NAFTA, supra note 4, at ch. 11.
36 The NAFTA Chapter Six essentially incorporates the GATT energy provisions,
which prohibit minimum or maximum export price requirements and minimum or maximum import price requirements. Id. at ch. 6.
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action was apparently minimal, partly because of prior notification by the
Canadian Government. Continued increases in prices of both oil and
gas, as well as further export restrictions, led to diminishing Canadian
exports to the United States beginning in 1974, and Canadian officials
announced that all exports of oil and gas would probably be cut off by
the end of the decade. However, changes in technical estimates of reserves, as well as of supply and demand, occur periodically. These, as
well as sudden dramatic events elsewhere in the world, can have significant effects on the policies of both countries. The situation is, therefore,
in a constant state of flux. In any event, there are more or less continuous negotiations between the two countries to mitigate the effects of any
cut-off which might occur.
In the late 1970s, the United States is primarily concerned with continued supplies to northern United States refineries and coordination of
the cut-off with the bringing on stream of Arctic petroleum resources.
Recently, the proposed shipment of oil from the terminal of the Alaska
pipeline at Valdez to Cherry Point, Washington, elicited a Canadian proposal that the question of protection against maritime pollution be referred to the International Joint Commission. The United States rejected
this but agreed to refer the matter to a joint committee on transborder
environmental problems, which led to an agreement on joint contingency
plans for spills of oil and other noxious substances in boundary waters
off the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.37
In January 1977, the United States and Canada concluded the Transit
Pipeline Treaty specifying the principles which should govern the transmission of hydrocarbons between different parts of the territory of one
country across the territory of the other. This treaty contains a provision
for arbitration of disputes concerning its interpretation, application, or
operation. The actual implementation of these principles in pipeline construction and operation has yet to be worked out. Although an agreement
on the building of a gas pipeline was concluded in September 1977, difficulties arose about its implementation. Some of them were due to the
complicating effects of a federal system in bilateral relations. For instance, the agreed principles prohibit discriminatory treatment in pipeline
taxation, and it has been warned that some of the affected taxing power is
3
The Canadian oil sands brings up memories of other "dirty oil" because of the
heavy clean-up costs associated with that type of crude and the additional greenhouse
gasses emitted. To ensure that the oil sands extractions are environmentally friendly, the
government has agreed to place a cap on CO 2 emissions in order to lessen the impact on
the environment. Hon. Michael Wilson, Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law
Institute Conference on the World's Longest Undefended Border: Gateway or Checkpoint? The Post-9/11 "Safe and Secure" Canada-United States Border in the Era of
Global Supply Chains (Apr. 18, 2008).
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within provincial instead of federal jurisdiction. In addition, there are
problems of apportionment among the states of the gas piped into the
United States and of the assignment of regulatory power.
Difficulties occasionally arise because of the impact of one country's
laws on the other, including, among other specific matters, attempts to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although it is a two-way street,
most commonly, problems have occurred with respect to United States
antitrust or export control laws which impose obligations or restrictions,
backed up by civil and criminal sanctions, upon United States citizens
abroad, or even non-citizens, concerning activities abroad which are not
illegal where conducted but have an "illegal" effect in the United States.
Prior consultation has sometimes alleviated problems arising from
the transnational impact of laws. For instance, in the mid-1950s, a United States court terminated a radio patent pool, which protected manufacturing in Canada by several subsidiaries of United States companies and
which had previously been declared legal by Canadian authorities. Canadian dissatisfaction led to the 1959 Fulton-Rogers agreement for prior
consultations on antitrust problems. Later the two countries agreed to be
guided by a recommendation on the subject by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Basford-Bell memorandum
of 1976-1977 reaffirmed the governments' commitment to prior consultation in this area. While this consultation machinery has helped to remove many of the difficulties, some problems have continued. In recent
years, there have been, for instance, problems with respect to the application of antitrust laws in the uranium and potash industries. The area is a
complex one, involving not only governmental investigations and interaction, but also private litigation. Recently, controversial United States
judicial orders have sought the production of corporate records held in
Canada and elsewhere; the records were to some extent protected from
disclosure by specific Canadian legislation.
A summit agreement in 1958 (the Diefenbaker-Eisenhower or SmithDulles agreement of 9 July) provided for future consultations on the applicability of United States export controls to Canadian subsidiaries of
United States companies and for possible exemptions for Canadian companies. Major problems arose in the early 1970s with respect to United
States export controls relating to communist States, but negotiations,
including ministerial consultations, have resulted in accommodations
which have alleviated much of the difficulty.
Examples of non-extraterritorial impact of laws are provided by the
existence of antipollution and vessel traffic management laws applicable
to marine areas near the border. In narrow passages, such as the Strait of
Juan de Fuca and the Grand Manan Channel, where one State's vessels
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pass routinely through the waters of the other, the question of waiver of
the applicability of these laws can be a source of difficulty.
The need to deal jointly with certain environmental conditions has
been recognized by Canada and the United States since well before the
present era of environmental action. Their concern with conditions and
uses of the waters adjacent to the boundary led to the establishment in
1905 of the International Waterways Commission. As that commission
did not have sufficient authority to deal with the complex problems presented to it, the two governments agreed in the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty to establish the International Joint Commission to consider applications for the use, obstruction, or diversion of boundary waters which
might affect the natural level or flow of these waters. This treaty is significant also because thereby the two Governments have agreed to substantial alteration of their basic riparian rights. Under the treaty, the two
Governments may also refer to the Commission, for report and recommendations, differences between them involving their rights or those of
their inhabitants along the boundary. Altogether the Commission has
dealt with more than one hundred applications and references, involving
a large variety of issues, not only relating to water levels but also to water and air pollution. Its recommendations, based on careful technical
studies and consultations with all the interests involved, have usually
been accepted. On the other hand, no cases have ever been submitted to
the Commission for "decision" under a broad clause in Article X of the
Treaty; the consent of both governments (including in the United States
prior advice and consent of the United States Senate) is required for each
such submission.
More recently established cooperative projects include the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978, a committee on water quality, also set up in 1972, for the St. John River and its international
tributaries, and the Poplar River Water Quality study started in 1977. In
1975, Canada and the United States referred to the International Joint
Commission the question of the transboundary water pollution effects
and other implications of the proposed Garrison Diversion Unit in North
Dakota. The record of these endeavors is a positive one, but much remains to be done as the process is a continuing one. The deferment of
38 The International Joint Commission (IJC), founded as part of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 is celebrating its 100th anniversary. For 100 years, the IJC has helped
Canada and the United States find common interest in regards to common water usage.
Notable examples of IJC-fostered American and Canadian Cooperation include: Pollution
of Boundary Waters, Trail Smelter, Columbia River, Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, and many others. See generally Welcome Page of the International Joint Commission, http://www.ijc.org/en/home/main-accueil.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
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the Garrison project may prove to be significant, but a final solution has
yet to be found. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972
and 1978 were important achievements for the Commission, but they
have proved difficult for the Governments to put into practice. Although
progress has been made, in several instances further implementing action
is required, not only by the federal governments, but also by those of
states and provinces.
Following, and partly because of the Arctic voyage of the United
States ship "Manhattan" in 1969, the Canadian government passed legislation for the establishment of 100-mile marine pollution control zones in
the Arctic. A contemporaneous revision of the Canadian declaration of
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice excluded from the Court's jurisdiction disputes relating to "the prevention
or control of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in
marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada." In justifying this revision,
concern was expressed over the limitations within which the Court must
operate and the deficiencies of the law which it must interpret and apply.
The establishment of marine pollution control zones in areas off the East
and West coasts to coincide with expanded fisheries jurisdiction has also
caused friction with the United States.
The classical case on transfrontier air pollution arose in connection
with a smelter at Trail, British Columbia, fumes from which caused
damage in the State of Washington. The matter went to the International
Joint Commission in 1928, but the United States rejected its findings.
The dispute was submitted in 1935 to a three-member arbitral tribunal,
which rendered decisions in 1938 and 1941. It awarded damages to the
United States, imposed a regime for control of fumes, and arranged for
future compulsory arbitration by a commission of scientists.
The question of transboundary air pollution in the Detroit-Windsor
and Sarnia-Port Huron areas was referred to the International Joint
Commission in 1966. On the basis of the Commission's report, the two
Governments asked the Commission in 1975 to monitor air quality in
that area and others. Currently, concern is being generated as a result of
new scientific studies which indicate that pollutants may be transported
by air currents over distances of many hundreds of miles from sources
deep within one country to the territory of the other.
Finally, the history of the relation between the two countries in matters of defense is an essentially cooperative one, with only occasional
and minor friction. Cooperation began in earnest with the Ogdensburg
Agreement of 1940, which inter alia established the Permanent Joint
Board on Defense. This body, which is still functioning, consists of military personnel from both countries who consult and advise on various
technical and operational issues of common concern.

54

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 35, Nos. 1 & 2]

Since the 1950s, Canada has been periodically concerned about the
relatively small proportion of Canadian contractors and personnel employed in the construction and manning of joint facilities, most of which
are located in Canada. Negotiations have resulted in increasing the opportunities for greater Canadian participation.
In the early 1960s, a disagreement arose over the United States' desire that Canada undertake the nuclear arming of its weapons systems
committed to NATO and the North American Air Defense Command
(NORAD). After several years of resistance, it did so in the mid-1960s.3 9
The foregoing is a very brief survey of some of the major common
concerns of the two countries which have produced difficulties in recent
years. A few, such as economics and pollution of the environment, seem
to have generated a steady stream of issues over the decades.4 0 Others
3
In the early 1960s, Canada and the United States had a diplomatic row due to the
Canadian Prime Minister refusing to arm Canada's NORAD Bomarc missiles with nuclear warheads during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, in 1963 under a new Prime Minister, Canada agreed to host NORAD nuclear warheads. Hosting of nuclear warheads
continued until Canada's complete divestment of nuclear warheads in 1984. In 2006,
both Canada and the United States fully renewed their commitment to NORAD. Ronald
G. Haycock & Michael Hennessy, The Roadfrom Innocence: Canadaand the Cold War,
1945 to 1963, in THE CANADIAN WAY OF WAR 235, 254-5 (Bernd Horn ed., 2006); see
JOHN CLEARWATER, CANADIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONs 241-45 (1998); see also Agreement
On The North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S.-Can., Apr. 28, 2006, Temp.
State Dep't. No. 06-134, 2006 WL 4099834.
40 The economic-based disputes of the last three decades are varied and include concerns such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy ("mad-cow" disease), oil sands, wheat
trade, and the decade-spanning softwood lumber dispute. Therefore, trade protectionism,
perceived or real, results in very real damage to bilateral trade, each issue having the
possibility to become cyclical and recurring, very much like the softwood issue. The last
few decades have also brought a host of environmental-based disputes including, the
export of Canadian trash into the United States, development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and issues relating to Alberta's oil sands. See Ryan Clements & Moin A.
Yahya, PrivateInterests, PublicBorders, and the NAFTA's Chapter 11: Lessonsfrom the
Mad-Cow Saga,45 ALTA. L. REv. 381, 383-93 (2007) (discussing mad-cow disease);
Alastair R. Lucas, Canada'sRole in the United State's Oil and Gas Supply Security: Oil
Sands, Arctic Gas, NAFTA, and CanadianKyoto ProtocolImpacts, 25 ENERGY L. J. 403,
422-23 (2004) (discussing Alberta's oil sands); Gary C. Hufbauer and Yee Wong, The
Canada/U.S.Economic Relationship:From FTA to NAFTA to ???: Security and the
Economy in the North American Context: The RoadAheadfor NAFTA, 29 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
53, 65-67 (2003) (discussing the wheat trade). See generally ReputationalFallacies in
InternationalLaw: A ComparativeReview of United States and Canadian Trade Actions,
30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 96-104 (2004) (noting the damage of trade protectionism). See
generally Sarah E. Lysons, Resolving the Softwood Lumber Dispute, 32 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 407, 439-40 (2009) (discussing the reasons for the recurrence of the softwood lumber dispute); Matthew D. Budds, No Canada:Analyzing Efforts to Keep Canadian Waste
in its Home andNative Land, 39 U. TOL. L. REv. 693 (2008) (discussing the concerns
related to importing garbage). See Michael T. Delcomyn, Arctic National Wildlfe Ref-
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have come to the fore only lately, after having lain dormant for a period.
These include boundary delimitation, made relevant by the worldwide
expansion of marine jurisdiction, and energy issues arising out of the last
few years' changes in prices, markets, and supplies. Other concerns are
less troublesome in the 1970s than they were in earlier decades. Defense, as noted, has caused relatively few disagreements in the immediate
past. However, this issue and many others-transit, border crossing,
tourism, air transport, internal security, and extradition, to name a feware always in the wings. Rapidly unfolding events, in the two countries
or elsewhere, may suddenly and unexpectedly bring any of them to the
center of the stage.41
The solution of many of these problems has been made more difficult by the federal nature of the constitutional systems of both countries.
Having more governmental units involved tends to delay and complicate
issues. Any strain in the relations within one country between the federal
government and the governments of one or more constituent units can
also have repercussions on international issues. A system of dispute settlement for the two countries must reflect a realistic appreciation of federal complexities. Past experience, as in the case of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements, has shown that the constituent units can and will
cooperate. And these complications should not lead one to the conclusion that nothing can or should be done. On the contrary, they make it
even more important for the international system to be well-developed
and complete. It should be able to function in coordination with the two
internal federal systems, and prevent international difficulties from magnifying or exacerbating domestic issues.

uge Oil: Canadianand Gwich'inIndian Legal Responses to 1002 Area Development, 24
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 789, 800-10 (2004) (noting the Canadian environmental concerns over
ANWR).
4 The coordinated response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the binational cooperation in fighting terrorism and securing the borders has ushered in a new
era of defense cooperation between Canada and the United States. See, e.g., David Charters, "Defence Against Help ": Canadian-AmericanCooperation in the War on Terrorism, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association
(Mar. 17, 2004), availableat http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73619-index.html.
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PART II. CANADIAN-UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
This portion of the report presents a brief analytical survey of the
types of dispute settlement procedures which are available for the resolution of disagreements between independent States, indicating for each
type the extent to which this method has been or is currently being used
by the United States and Canada.
The various mechanisms for settlement may be broadly divided into
two categories: those which produce a result or decision which binds the
parties and those which do not. The non-binding procedures may in turn
be divided into two groups: (1) strictly bilateral methods of settlement,
such as negotiation and the mixed commission; and (2) procedures which
make use of third parties in some intermediary capacity, such as good
offices, mediation, and conciliation. In a certain sense, non-binding procedures may also be considered as methods of dispute management.
Although they often do lead to a binding agreement which solves the
problem, these procedures do not automatically lead to a binding result
and thus do not ensure a settlement of the dispute. The principal binding
methods of settlement are arbitration and reference to a permanent judicial tribunal. A third device, reference to an international political or
administrative organ such as the United Nations Security Council or the
Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization, has not been
used in the North American context, and there is no need to consider it
here.
Negotiation is the rule in United States-Canadian dispute settlement.
In general, however, this is a matter of practice and habit rather than legal obligation. There are very few areas in which the two countries are
bound by a bilateral instrument to negotiation in the event of a dispute.
A number of the two countries' agreements do provide for the use of a
mixed commission, which is to some extent a specialized form of negotiation. But even in these agreements, referral to the commission is nearly
always optional. Furthermore, it is dependent upon agreement between
the Governments after a dispute has already arisen. This is true, for instance, of a large part of the work of the International Joint Commission.
The crucial point about United States-Canadian practice in dispute
settlement is that it makes almost exclusive use of some form of strictly
bilateral settlement. However, not all negotiations or mixed commissions are successful. Indeed, in many of the most difficult disputes between the two countries, unproductive negotiations have dragged on for
years while the problem actually becomes aggravated or more complex.
In other cases, negotiations may be suspended when the issue under discussion loses its immediacy. The problem, left unsolved, may resurface,
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and then efforts at solution will have to start from the beginning all over
again. Negotiations cannot, by themselves, constitute an adequate dispute settlement system for two countries with a relationship as close,
extensive, and complicated as that of the United States and Canada.
There need to be a number of mechanisms to supply a definitive answer
where negotiations fail. They should be capable of aiding and directing
the negotiating process, of increasing the effectiveness of that process.
Fact-finding, through the International Joint Commission and other
mixed committees, can help. Indeed, the collegial or shared nature of the
International Joint Commission's fact-finding is itself a contribution to
mutual understanding. Once the facts are agreed within the group, the
dispute is usually resolved very quickly. Unfortunately, as has already
been noted, use of these procedures is only optional; they cannot be effective if they are not used.
Where a dispute is a legal one or has legal aspects, obligatory arbitration may be the most efficient and equitable means of settlement. Where
a dispute is wholly legal, the prospect of compulsory arbitration encourages negotiators to find a solution. Where a dispute is partially legal,
arbitration of the legal questions can reduce the dimensions of the dispute and provide a framework, which will simplify resolution of the remaining issues.
The Group recognizes that the question of what constitutes a "legal"
issue has been the subject of learned debate, and that in the abstract the
line between legal and non-legal may be difficult to draw. It must be
noted, however, that whenever courts have been faced with this problem,
they have always been able to make the distinction. It is the practical,
not the theoretical, distinction which is important. Domestic courts regularly have to deal with the problem, and it has not hindered the municipal
judicial system. The International Court of Justice has faced and solved
it several times. There is no cause to believe that a bilateral international
arbitral system could not handle the matter as well.
Whatever the precise nature of these arbitrable issues, the important
point is that there are questions on which the two States may reasonably
disagree. Sometimes, a genuine reconciliation of legally supportable
conflicting positions cannot be had through negotiations, and each side
continues to emphasize the legal validity or the equity of its claim. At
other times, difficult and unsettling negotiations do lead to a solution, but
it is not a genuine accommodation. Instead, it is a patching over of the
fundamental disagreement, or a solution based on political advantage or
bargaining power. Such results are not the makings of solid foundations
for any relationship. The Group believes that in these cases the automatic availability of arbitration will not create acrimony or mistrust. Rather
it will reduce tension and diminish frustration; it will assure that a genu-
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ine and impartial solution can be had if negotiations will not produce
one.
Dispute Avoidance
Before surveying methods of dealing with disputes, the Group wishes to note two dispute avoidance procedures which it considered: 1) executive or administrative prior consultation and 2) legislative or regulatory coordination and cooperation. Both are examples of the use of negotiations to keep disputes from arising, rather than using them to manage
already existing disputes.
Government officials in each country are likely to have some idea,
prior to making a policy decision or taking implementing action, whether
it may have an adverse effect in the other. In such a case, prior consultation with the appropriate officials of the other government may lead to
minor adjustments or accommodations which can minimize the adverse
effects and thus prevent a dispute. Lack of such consultation, or at least
a timely notice, may lead to needless friction, especially if public positions are taken before compromise is attempted. When this happens,
adjustments which could have solved problems before the fact may no
longer be sufficient.
Thus, as pointed out in Part I, prior consultation has in a few casesby Canada on energy plans and by the United States on balance of payments plans and some antitrust enforcement matters-contributed to the
accomplishment of policy shifts which attenuated the discomfort of the
other Party. The absence of such prior consultation in other situations
seems to have aggravated matters even though settlements were eventually reached. An exchange of letters in 1976 between the International
Joint Commission and the two Governments clarified the duty of the
Commission to "alert" both Governments to any problems it sees looming ahead. Thus the Commission provides a form of prior consultation,
but it is limited in fact by the amount of information available to the
Commission from Boards and public sources, and this necessarily presents problems. Apart from these examples, there has been little serious
or sustained effort to regularize prior consultations between the two
Governments. The decision as to whether or not to consult has been left
to be made ad hoc by the responsible department or bureau officials.
The Group discussed the possibility of recommending that the two
governments mutually commit themselves to consultations prior to the
adoption of measures that might adversely affect the other party. The
Group examined several draft texts of treaty articles to this effect. These
are attached as Annex A. Study of these drafts made it apparent that a
commitment to prior consultation would require detailed study of a num-
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ber of very difficult problems. For the consultation to have meaning, it
must be more than a simple notice requirement, devoid of any obligation
to pay attention to the other party's response. On the other hand, any
fixed obligation to heed the response of the other party might appear to
compromise the sovereign independence or discretion of the consulting
party. In order to make the requirement unambiguous, it would be necessary to specify with some precision both which persons or institutions
would have to be affected and the significance and nature of the effect
necessary to give rise to the obligation. Since governmental activity is so
often a continuous flow of small decisions, it would also be important to
specify the kinds of measures which might precipitate the consultation
requirement. In addition, there was some feeling that a list of appropriate
subject areas for consultation might also be an important part of any recommendation. The Group concluded that all of these determinations
involved political, diplomatic, and technical considerations, as well as
legal ones. Although the Group decided not to make substantive recommendations on the matter, it does feel that the possibility of a prior consultation regime, founded on a legal obligation, should be given serious
attention by the competent officials of the two Governments.
Legislative and regulatory decision-making processes do not lend
themselves to the kind of prior consultation described above for avoiding
disputes concerning executive and related administrative decisions. Legislative and regulatory processes are more rigidly structured. At the
same time, they are more diffuse; final authority is usually vested in a
committee or series of them rather than in an individual. The Group considered that one way to avoid having disputes result from such decisions
was to involve the other Government in the process of making them.
That is, each Government should enhance the possibilities for the other
to put its position before the legislative or administrative agencies preparing the laws or regulations. The Group recognizes and applauds the
fact that this does occur in some cases. Presentation by Canadian officials of factual information to Congressional Committees and administrative bodies, appearances of United States gas importers before Canada's
National Energy Board, lobbying in legislatures, and speeches by governmental officials are all examples of such interchange. The Group
realizes that there are in some areas, such as legislative testimony, substantial impediments to these procedures, but it recommends a comprehensive survey of the possibilities with a view to expansion and regularization of this kind of cooperation.
A second method of avoiding legislative or regulatory disagreements
would be the actual coordination of measures-clarification of standards
or meshing of laws. In certain areas, environmental regulation, for example, uniformity or at least compatibility would be particularly appro-
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priate. The Group notes with interest the continuing work of the Interparliamentary Group, through which representatives of the two federal
legislatures consult regularly. Great potential for coordination is also
offered by the existence of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada and
the United States National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Noting the present cooperation between these two bodies,
the Group would encourage a more regular coordination of their activities.
Obviously, complexity and difficulty will be attendant upon any attempt at either cooperation or coordination. Tremendous quantities of
information would have to be assembled, digested, and analyzed before
any system for either could be created. Most-favored-nation obligations
and other multilateral commitments could intervene. The autonomy of
federal subdivisions could frustrate efforts or render them meaningless.
Nevertheless, the value and long-term effects of any successful endeavor
would be considerable and would, in the Group's view, justify the substantial undertaking which would be required. In the final analysis, dispute avoidance is preferable to any system of settlement.
Dispute Management
The most fundamental and most common method of dispute management is negotiation-direct bilateral consultation between Governments. At the same time, it can be the most complex and difficult, particularly when the countries involved are large industrialized States such
as the United States and Canada. Each has a multifaceted executive,
divided into many departments and agencies. Not only may several departments or agencies in each government be concerned with a particular
question in dispute, those on one side may differ among themselves on
the question. In addition, there are legislative chambers which may have
prerogatives or interests which must be protected or considered in structuring the negotiation. Both Canada and the United States are federal
States whose constituent members must often be consulted or actually
involved in the discussions. Sometimes there arise problems where a
United States federal state and a Canadian province are on one side and
the two central Governments are on the other. An example was the de
facto alliance between some "northern tier" states and some Canadian
provinces in certain questions of gas and oil transmission and allocation
in the 1960s. Finally, well-organized or large-scale private interests
sometimes play a role in negotiations. This was true, for example, in the
Auto Pact case, where letters of intent from the companies to the Canadian Government were an essential part of the agreement. In another example, an American company and the Canadian Government combined
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in support of a common interest. In the late 1950s, the United States
planned to curtail development of the BOMARC missile. Canada wanted the procurement program for the missile to be maintained. It seems
that efforts in the United States by Boeing Aircraft Corporation, the
United States manufacturer of the missile, contributed to the attainment
of Canada's goal.
The classical form of negotiations is through so-called "normal diplomatic channels"; the countries' respective Foreign Offices and diplomatic representatives either conduct all of the discussions themselves, or
they preside over complex delegations representing various parts of the
Governments.
Increasingly, negotiations take place directly between what treaty
clauses refer to as the "competent authorities" of each party. Double
taxation questions, for instance, might be considered at meetings between officials of the United States Treasury Department and the Canadian Department of Finance; or conservation questions, at meetings between Interior and Environment representatives. In such negotiations,
Department of State or Department of External Affairs involvement is
often either nominal or completely absent. In recent years, this form of
negotiation has become common in United States-Canadian relations.
The two countries cooperate on a daily basis in so many areas that informal contact becomes routine. As a result, a substantial network of
personal and professional relationships between corresponding officials
in all areas of government has come into being.
At the other end of the spectrum from these quiet, unpublicized
communications are "summit" discussions. The BOMARC question
mentioned above, as well as such issues as the magazine tax, sales to
communist States, and the nuclear arming of Canadian weapon systems,
which were referred to in Part I, are all examples of disagreements where
summit diplomacy contributed to a resolution. These highly visible
meetings between Heads of State or Foreign Ministers usually concern
particularly important or difficult problems and are typically the culmination of extensive negotiation at lower levels. Such meetings have been
a regular part of the Canadian-United States dispute settlement pattern.
Where a problem is recurrent or where a situation, particularly a
technical one, requires continuous oversight, negotiations may be institutionalized in the form of a mixed commission. Mixed or joint commissions typically comprise an equal, often fixed, number of representatives
from each Government who meet to consider problems, frequently at
specified alternate locations, either on a regular schedule or ad hoc as
crises arise. They are usually composed of representatives of the two
Governments or of administrative specialists in a field, and are sometimes authorized to include technical experts or diplomatic or legal per-
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sonnel in their deliberations. Such commissions are frequently authorized to act by consensus, but they are not normally empowered to settle
definitively a dispute, and there is in any case no impartial member to
cast a deciding vote in case of a deadlock. Nevertheless, a body with a
fairly constant membership may over time begin to function as an organic unit, without regular adherence to divisions by country. Such a body
can thus become a very useful means of fact-finding. A conclusion on
the facts of a dispute can, like a legal opinion, simplify the case and provide a framework which makes it easier for the Governments to resolve
the remaining issues by negotiation.
After simple negotiation, the mixed commission is the device most
commonly employed to handle Canadian-United States disputes. As a
numerical proposition, without reference to the varying significance of
different disputes, all but a small handful of difficulties between the two
countries in this century have been dealt with through one of these two
means or a combination of them. Numerous standing commissions have
operated in a variety of areas. High-level bodies of general competence
include the Interparliamentary Group, which meets annually, and the
Joint Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which met
frequently during the 1950s and 1960s. Among specialized bodies noted
in Part I are the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission and
the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Others not previously mentioned
include, for example, the Balance of Payments Committee, the Columbia
River Commission, several international bridge commissions, and the
Roosevelt-Campobello International Park Commission.
Foremost among Canadian-United States mixed commissions is the
International Joint Commission (IJC). The Group considered in some
detail the structure and operation of this body, and met with both Chairmen and some of the Commission's members and staff. It has already
been noted that the IJC has dealt with more than 100 references since its
creation in 1909, and that its recommendations concerning boundary
water questions have in most cases been adopted by the Governments.
Its six commissioners represent political, legal, technical, and administrative viewpoints; in addition, its smooth functioning bespeaks a successful
amalgamation of these diversities. A very small permanent staff, divided
into United States and Canadian sections, assists the IJC in the performance of its functions. The sections, each of which consists of legal,
administrative, and technical personnel, work separately in Washington
and Ottawa, while maintaining the closest consultation with each other.
The existence of such a secretariat facilitates the commission's work in a
variety of ways. It provides human continuity as members of the Commission change over the years. The regular personal contact between the
United States and Canadian staff members promotes understanding and
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helps to set the generally conciliatory tone of Commission meetings. By
thorough preparatory work, the staff helps to avoid misunderstandings
based on faulty or inadequate information and thus contributes to the
efficient dispatch of business and to informed and sound recommendations.
Although the IJC has limited quasi-judicial power with respect to
applications for use, obstruction, or diversion of boundary waters, its
great distinction is its signal success in technical fact-finding and advice
to the Governments in response to references of questions on a growing
range of other boundary water questions. The Commission refers each
question to an expert study group, composed of nationals of both countries, which attempts to agree on a technical assessment of the question.
It draws heavily on existing governmental expertise, borrowing especially qualified personnel from various government departments. But ascertaining the facts is not enough. As one Commissioner pointed out, the
difficulty is not in finding the facts, but in agreeing on the interpretation
of them. This requires a blend of technical and political knowledge, and
the mixed composition of the Commission is well suited for this purpose.
On the basis of the study group's report and hearings, the IJC makes a
recommendation. Eighty percent of the time they are accepted by the
Governments and used to resolve the dispute.
For some time the scope of the IJC's activity has been growing slowly and now includes substantial jurisdiction over water and even air pollution, as well as over industrial development. At the study-group level,
this expansion of workload and broadened competence can be accommodated by appointing more study groups of differing expertise. However, the Commission itself remains fixed at six members, four of whom
are part time. Thus, the members report, its workload is becoming increasingly burdensome. But perceived advantages of the present structure would be lost if the Commissioners were made full time or if their
numbers were expanded. The six-member IJC allows for the informality
and cordiality which permit it to function as a unit and to achieve consensus relatively easily. The part-time Commissioners are able to maintain genuine links with the constituencies which they represent. Other
possibilities for handling an increased load or investigation of new areas
might be the appointment of teams of deputy Commissioners or of new
Commissions. New Commissions, although they might be customdesigned to be competent in other technical areas, would not have the
tradition of the original UC behind them. Teams of deputy Commissioners would have. In any case, if the work of the Commission is to continue to expand and diversify, at some point this dilemma will have to be
faced.
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In certain areas of dispute, too few questions may arise to warrant the
intervention of the International Joint Commission or the creation of a
new permanent commission. If, however, in some area there are likely to
be a number of occasions for ad hoc negotiations over the years, the governments may wish to consider the establishment of a permanent joint
secretariat to assist in those negotiations.
In three methods of international accommodation, third parties are
employed in intermediary capacities to assist the disputants in reaching
an agreement. These are good offices, mediation, and conciliation. The
third parties have no power to bind the parties to a particular solution, or
indeed to any solution at all. Their function is merely to advise, accommodate, and reconcile so that the parties may come to a bilateral settlement. These procedures are on the borderline between dispute management and dispute settlement. While these procedures do not bind the
parties, they do, especially in the case of conciliation, offer the possibility of an impartial opinion which can form the basis of a settlement.
Both the United States and Canada are parties to the 1899 Hague
Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which
contains, among other things, provisions on good offices, mediation, and
international commissions of inquiry. In 1914, the United Kingdom and
the United States concluded an agreement which provided for an international conciliation commission of five members, to which disputes, including Canadian-United States disputes, could be submitted for investigation and report. In 1940, Canada and the United States amended this
treaty as between them to provide directly for Canadian appointment of
its members of the Commission.
Although all of these procedures remain available to Canada and the
United States, there has been no instance to date of any of them being
used. This is perhaps to be expected. These non-legal third party procedures are used primarily where non-binding settlement is appropriate but
the disputants have difficulty with direct bilateral contact because of
strained relations or fundamental difference of background, approach, or
point of view. The United States and Canada have not found it necessary
to use intermediaries to get bilateral negotiations started.
Dispute Settlement
Only where a binding procedure can be easily triggered by either
party if no settlement is reached through non-binding procedures are the
parties assured that the dispute will actually be settled. For the resolution
of legal disputes, two binding methods of settlement are available: (1) ad
hoc arbitration and (2) a permanent judicial tribunal. Arbitration is more
commonly used.
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Arbitral bodies are distinguished by ad hoc appointment of members,
at least one of whom must be independent of the control of either disputant. Four forms of arbitration have been in more or less common use
over the past half-century. These are the single neutral arbitrator, the
three-member tribunal, and two types of five-member tribunals. In the
five-member tribunal, there may be one arbitrator selected by each side
and three neutral members, or there may be two arbitrators selected by
each side (one or both of which may be its citizens) and only one impartial member.
The differences in composition among these four models may produce important differences in the conduct of the proceedings and in the
nature of the result reached. Although the value of such latitude is debatable, the single arbitrator is obviously free to arrive at a decision
which does not wholly favor either disputant. The independent member
of tribunals of three (or five where there is only one neutral) does not
necessarily have this freedom, since he must obtain the concurrent vote
of a national member (or two members) in order to reach a decision.
Where there are three neutral members on a panel of five the influence of
the national members is minimized, as the independent arbitrators may
decide without the agreement of either national arbitrator. Such a tribunal has thus the same freedom as the sole arbitrator, and like him may be
appropriate where bilateral negotiations between the parties are or have
been particularly difficult or acrimonious.
Because it is an ad hoc procedure, arbitration carries with it the problem of selecting the panel for each case. Numerous selection methods
are employed, all directed to the reconciliation of two somewhat conflicting purposes: (1) giving the parties maximum control over the selection
process; and (2) ensuring that neither of them can frustrate or sabotage it.
Most of those provisions which do protect against the parties' default
employ the services of a neutral third party. If one party does not make
its appointment or the parties cannot agree on an independent member or
members, this neutral party is empowered to do so, usually at the request
of one of the parties.
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for Pacific Settlement both
contain provisions on international arbitration. But the text of the 1907
Convention is more detailed, especially with respect to the structure,
powers, and procedure of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is,
however, not a court in a true sense but primarily a panel from which
parties may select members of an arbitral tribunal. Though the United
Kingdom has become a party to the 1907 Convention on that subject,
Canada does not seem to consider itself bound by it but has accepted the
1899 one. The United States ratified the 1907 Convention with reservations. These specify that recourse to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
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at The Hague could be had only by agreement thereto through general or
special treaties of arbitration. They also rejected the power of the Court
to formulate a compromis in the absence of agreement thereon between
the disputing parties.
As between the United States and Canada, one must therefore look to
the procedures under the 1899 Convention. These may be resorted to
only through a general or special agreement between the parties. Such a
special agreement was concluded by the United Kingdom and the United
States in 1910 with respect to a large number of pecuniary claims outstanding between the parties, including a considerable number of Canadian claims, one of which involved the Cayuga Indians and led to a decision based on equity which became a landmark in international law.
In 1908, the United Kingdom and the United States entered into a
general arbitration convention, agreeing to submit to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague "differences which may arise of a
legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties," but excepting
disputes affecting the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of
the two parties. It also excepted disputes concerning the interests of third
parties. A special agreement had to be concluded in each case, requiring
on the part of the United Kingdom in cases involving one of the Dominions the concurrence of the Government of the Dominion concerned.
The 1908 Convention was concluded for a period of five years only, but
was extended for similar periods by agreements of 1913, 1918, and 1923.
While Canada agreed in 1927 to further extension of the 1908 Convention, the United States suggested replacement of the old reservations by
new ones. The discussion of a revised text was later postponed in order
to not interfere with the concurrent negotiations on the Briand-Kellogg
Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and it does not appear that it has
been resumed after the completion of these negotiations.
A provision is also contained in Article X of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 for reference of particular questions or matters of difference to the International Joint Commission acting as an arbitral tribunal,
with the addition in certain circumstances of a neutral umpire. Such reference requires, however, in each case the consent of the two parties, and
no reference has yet been made under this provision. Moreover, it is not
a judicial body; in particular, it is composed mostly of non-lawyers.
Besides arbitrations under a 1910 claims agreement, there have been
four prominent ad hoc arbitrations between the United States and Canada
in this century. The first was the famous North Atlantic Fisheries controversy, which was referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
The Hague. The tribunal decided the crucial issue of fishing in certain
bays in favor of the United Kingdom (i.e., Canada).
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The second case arose in 1929 when a United States Government
revenue cutter fired upon and sank a Canadian private vessel known as
the I'm Alone in the course of pursuit for suspected smuggling of liquor.
Several of the crew were lost. The question was referred to two commissioners appointed under the 1924 Convention relating to the prevention
of smuggling of intoxicating liquors. The commissioners agreed and
gave reports in 1933 and 1935, the latter granting compensation to Canada for the unlawful act of sinking and for damage to the captain and the
crew.
The dispute settlement procedure employed in the I'm Alone case is
an example of the sequential use of the mixed commission and arbitration. If the two national commissioners had not been able to agree, the
treaty would have required the appointment of a third commissioner.
This neutral member would, as umpire, have had the exclusive power to
settle the dispute. Thus, he would have been the functional equivalent of
a sole arbitrator, despite the appearance of a three-member tribunal. An
earlier example of the actual use of such a neutral arbitrator was the
United States-British claims commission of 1853. Umpire Bates settled
claims between 1853 and 1855.
The third case was the Trail Smelter arbitration, resulting in the
awards of 1938 and 1941. These decisions, which awarded transfrontier
pollution damages to the United States, are detailed in Part I.
Fourthly, there was the 1967-1968 arbitration concerning the Gut
Dam by the three-member Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal constituted
pursuant to a 1965 compromis. This case involved many claims by
United States owners of property on Lake Ontario that the placement of
the dam, a Canadian navigational aid, contributed to water damage which
these properties suffered in the early 1950s. After the tribunal determined the basis and scope of liability, damage payments pursuant to a
1968 lump sum agreement finally settled the matter.
A fifth case, the Alaska Boundary "arbitration" of 1903, was not really an arbitration. It was a mixed commission of six with no neutral
members: three United States representatives, two Canadian, and one
British. In a controversial decision, it drew the boundary between British
Columbia and Alaska in a way favorable to the United States position.
Deadlock was avoided because the British commissioner, Lord Alverstone, did not vote with the Canadian members.
The second, and more formal method of binding settlement of legal
questions is by reference to a permanent judicial tribunal. Although in
some parts of the world, notably Western Europe, there are regional or
special purpose courts, the only general international judicial body to
which the United States and Canada both have access is the International
Court of Justice at The Hague.
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Both Canada and the United States have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, but their acceptances are limited by substantial
reservations. Canada first accepted the World Court's jurisdiction in
1929, excluding inter alia "disputes with regard to questions which by
international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Dominion
of Canada." In 1939, Canada added a reservation covering disputes arising out of events occurring during World War II. As noted in Part I,
another reservation was made by Canada in 1970, excluding "disputes
arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by
Canada in respect of the conservation, management, or exploitation of
the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control
of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas
adjacent to the coast of Canada."
The declaration by the United States accepting the jurisdiction of the
Court, made in 1946, excludes inter alia "disputes with regard to matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States of America as determined by the United States of America," and
"disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the
treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the
Court or (2) the United States of America specifically agrees to jurisdiction." In the first instance, the United States can itself determine in each
case whether the matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction,
and any such unilateral determination automatically deprives the Court
of its jurisdiction.
As any acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court is subject to the
condition of reciprocity, Canada can invoke not only the reservations in
her own declaration but also those in the United States declaration; similarly the United States can avail itself of the Canadian exclusions. Consequently, for all practical purposes, the two countries have at present no
obligation to submit disputes to the International Court of Justice, and
despite some proposals that certain disputes between them be submitted
to the Court, none has been submitted. As noted in Part I, Canada justifies its reluctance to submit disputes to the Court by "the deficiencies of
the law which it must interpret and apply."
While there is no Canadian at present on the Court, in any case in
which it is involved, Canada can appoint a judge ad hoc, having equal
rights with other members of the Court. To facilitate submission of cases
to the International Court of Justice, the Court has recently modified its
rules, making it easier to establish special small "chambers," increasing
the role which the parties to a case may play in the selection of judges
who would be the members of such a chamber and thereby bringing the
method of their establishment closer to that of an arbitral tribunal. Such
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chamber could also sit in North America, thus making it more easily
accessible to the parties.
Follow-up Arrangements
Monitoring of the System
There is presently no systematic procedure available for following up
on the results obtained by recourse to the various methods. By monitoring the individual cases which go through the settlement process, it
would be possible to evaluate the entire system of settlement and to adjust it periodically as needed. Any decision by the two Governments to
improve and complete their dispute settlement apparatus along the lines
elaborated in Part III should include a commitment to keep the entire
structure under scrutiny.
Follow-up on Particular Disputes
This sort of follow-up is to be distinguished from continuing supervision of a particular situation following the resolution of a dispute. This
may be done by the deciding body on its own initiative, as did the Trail
Smelter tribunal, which set up a procedure for monitoring local environmental conditions. The parties themselves may arrange for further supervision, either on their own initiative or at the suggestion of a joint
advisory body. An example of the latter is the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, established on the recommendation of the International Joint
Commission. That Commission itself often watches over the implementation of its recommendations. Monitoring the operation of a settlement
of a dispute, where appropriate, is another means of avoiding further
disputes.
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PART III. RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR SETTLING
LEGAL DISPUTES
The preceding survey of the existing means for dealing with disputes
between Canada and the United States shows that more or less informal
channels of diplomatic, ministerial or parliamentary consultations for
dispute avoidance are being used quite successfully in a number of areas.
Various political and technical dispute settlement mechanisms continue
to be successful in certain other areas. But at present there are no procedures readily available for resolving disagreements of a legal nature between the two countries or their nationals.
The shared legal and judicial traditions of the two countries constitute a firm basis for cooperation in legal settlement of international disputes. Certain disputes can best be solved by legal means; in others, the
resolution of the legal issues facilitates the settlement of other aspects of
a dispute. The first steps in this direction might be relatively simple;
however, only if they are successful will more institutionalized methods
follow. In addition, early proposals should focus sharply on problems
for which international legal solutions are likely to be most appropriate.
Initial success in limited areas might lead to the application of these proposals to a wider range of questions.
Accordingly, we suggest that our two Governments might at first
adopt just two new procedures, one to assist in their solution of private
disputes, the other to accommodate intergovernmental problems. The
first would deal with cases of transfrontier pollution. The second would
provide a compulsory third-party settlement system for treaty interpretation disputes.
1. Private Remedies in Each Other's Courts: Transfrontier Pollution - A
Beginning
The private citizens and companies of our two countries have regular
contact in virtually every area of economic and human endeavor. Disputes arise between them over all of the same matters which trouble relations between persons of the same nationality. As in domestic life and
commerce, some in each area cannot always be resolved amicably.
Therefore, our two countries' citizens and businesses have, as a practical
matter, the same comprehensive need for recourse to civil litigation
against each other as they do with respect to their fellow nationals. For a
variety of reasons-judicial requirements of standing, problems of execution of judgments, and the rule of stare decisis, among othersnationals of the two countries either do not have the same rights of ac-
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cess to each other's courts as do the country's own nationals or they have
the same right of access but not the same remedies.
The two governments could, by a single agreement, bind themselves
to make changes in their judicial procedures which would grant equality
of access and remedies to nationals of either country in the courts of the
other for all types of litigation. However, the Group feels that this course
would be unwise, even if the goal is desirable. Such action would require
bringing into working union the extremely complex bodies of local and
federal statutory and common law of the two countries. It would also
effectively add another facet to the already intricate judicial systems required by the federal style of government. The confusion and contradictions which could result from the complicating effects of these two facts
might be worse than the frustrations of the present impediments to transfrontier litigation. Even if an agreement were reached, there would be no
guarantee that the necessary provincial and state legislation would be
obtained.
A growing number of statutory rights, rules, and remedies supplement and limit or expand the substantive common law in virtually every
possible area of litigation, from consumer protection to commercial
codes and antitrust or monopoly law. In turn, case law elaborates and
modifies the basic statutory language.
A preliminary step in dealing with these problems might be the establishment of a liaison group between the Uniform Law Conference of
Canada and the United States National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to provide for continuous review and coordination
of legislation on matters of common interest. Such a group might even
draft model uniform legislation for the two Governments and their subdivisions. 42 This eventuality is probably not in the near future; however,
in a few instances, such cooperation was possible in the past. Even if it
were, the two countries' pre-existing legislation would still have to be
minutely examined and compared in each possible subject area of litigation between nationals of the two States before equal remedies could be
made available in the courts of both countries. In the short run, the magnitude of this task is forbidding.
This was done for transfrontier pollution through the Draft Treaty on a Regime of
Equal Access and Remedy in Cases of TransfrontierPollution, drawn up by a joint working group of the American Bar Association and the Canadian Bar Association and recommended to the respective national governments by vote of the two organizations in
1979. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access,
http://www.ulcc.calen/us/index.cfn?sec=l&sub=1t4 (last visited Apr. 14, 2009); see also
Joel A. Gallob, Birth ofthe North American TransboundaryEnvironmentalPlaintiff
TransboundaryPollution and the 1979 Draft Treatyfor Equal Access and Remedy, 15
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 85 (1991).
42
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Judicial structures in both countries, as well as the laws applied in
their courts, reflect the over all federal structure of both governments.
The proper court of first instance for a foreign plaintiff may be a federal
or a state or provincial court; in some cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it
may be either. Each federal subdivision of each country has its own judicial traditions and rules of procedure, which may or may not be similar
to those of the central national judiciary. The applicable substantive law
in one state or province may differ from that of a neighboring state or
province on the same side of the border. Sometimes, because of overlapping legislative power, a combination of national and local laws must
be applied by a court. This complexity occasionally even works to frustrate litigation across federal divisions within one country.
A considerable effort would obviously be required not only to identify and analyze problems resulting from these complications, but also to
devise means of controlling them so that international civil litigation
might proceed in a regular and predictable fashion. A certain amount of
trial and error development would be necessary. Effective management
of the experiment is really possible only if the first attempt at equalizing
court access and remedies is limited to a single area of substantive law.
The Group proposes that this area be transfrontier pollution.
A number of reasons suggest themselves in support of this selection.
In general, transfrontier pollution cases will primarily affect only those
living or working near the borders of the two countries. Such persons
will be likely already to have experience in transfrontier dealings in a
variety of areas, and therefore should be most able to work effectively
and efficiently in such cases. Most of the comparatively few commonlaw precedents which recognize the availability of remedies to foreign
plaintiffs relate to pollution or related nuisance cases. In a similar situation, the group of four Scandinavian States has entered into an agreement
which provides, among other things, for reciprocal private and public
remedies in pollution cases. Their experience can provide a model for
study and improvement by our two governments. Environmental matters
are prominent current concerns of the public in both States. Therefore,
our populations would be likely to support the adoption and implementation of a mutual equal remedies regime. Finally, the problem of transfrontier pollution is rooted in the reality of the natural world. As a physical proposition, there is no difference between international and internal
pollution.
In May 1977, the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) made a detailed recommendation for the
implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and NonDiscrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution. The text of this
recommendation has been set out as Annex B to the present report. This
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action by the OECD is the culmination of several years' study of the
problem in member states. Both the United States and Canada are members of OECD. They are unusual among the members in that, for them,
transfrontier pollution is essentially a bilateral problem. Therefore, it is
particularly appropriate that our two governments should be the ones to
take the lead in putting the council's recommendations into practice.
The OECD decision is in the form of a general recommendation
elaborated in particular detail by an annexed list of ten principles. Several of these advocate advance consultation and coordination along the
lines already noted in this Part and in Part II of policy and legislative and
administrative action on pollution matters. Among the goals of such
concerted action are uniform environmental quality standards, nondiscrimination between the domestic and international effects of pollution, and compatible land use planning. The recommendation proposes
an obligation to exchange all information which may be relevant to transfrontier pollution or to cooperation for its prevention.
The Group endorses the principles represented in these portions of
the OECD recommendation. As noted, exchange of information is probably a precondition to effective private remedies. The Group also notes,
however, that most of these matters are problems of executive and legislative policy, and relate partly to economic development programs.
Therefore, the Group has refrained from commenting on these points in
detail.
The remainder of the OECD principles relates to making the remedies existing in the judicial system of each country available to residents
of others. The Group has modified these principles to conform to the
bilateral situation of the two countries, and recast them in the form of
draft treaty articles. Recognizing that implementation of these principles
will entail a complex and perhaps extended program of legislative, administrative, and judicial change at several levels, the Group has nevertheless chosen the treaty form over other less formal types of agreement.
It is hoped that the solemnity of treaty obligations would provide the
stimulus and the political incentive to generate promptly the necessary
changes on a comprehensive and coordinated basis at all levels.
The Group concedes that there are other approaches, some of which
are certainly less attractive. The Governments might make a joint statement of intent embodying the principles, or come to some other nontreaty understanding. Another possibility is a treaty providing for implementation on a gradual or staged basis. An example of such a staged
approach already exists, in the form of the arrangement relating to the
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Dome-Canmar drilling project in the Beaufort Sea.43 Because Canada
decided that its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act would probably
not provide a remedy for damage sustained in Alaska as a result of a spill
on the Canadian side, an arrangement was entered into with the permittees and their insurers to provide a remedy for United States claimants
equivalent to that provided for in the Act.
There is also a possibility which is actually within the general treaty
framework. Since 1972, the Hague Conventions on private international
law have contained a federal State clause which, in the opinion of the
Group, might be usable in the present situation. For instance, Article 35
in the Convention on international administration of the estates of deceased persons, adopted on 21 October 1972, reads as follows:
If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which
different systems of law apply in relation to matters of estate administration, it may declare that this Convention shall extend to all
its territorial units or only to one or more of them, and may modify
its declaration by submitting another declaration at any time.
These declarations shall state expressly the territorial units to
which the Convention applies.
Other Contracting States may decline to recognize a certificate if,
at the date on which recognition is sought, the Convention is not
applicable to the territorial unit in which the certificate was issued.
Such a clause allows full ratification of a treaty by a federal State and
its immediate application to so much of the subject matter of the treaty as
is within the federal jurisdiction. Simultaneous or subsequent declarations of applicability to particular states or provinces can be added as and
when the practice of the various constituent units is brought into conformity with the treaty.

43 In 1976 and 1977, Dome Petroleum wanted to engage in exploratory drilling in the
Beaufort Sea and sought authorization from the Canadian Government to initiate offshore
oil and gas operations. Neighboring Alaska was concerned about the adequacy of safety
measures and the availability of funds to potential pollution victims outside of Canada
due to the risk of a significant oil spill. After discussions, the Governments of Canada
and the United States reached a settlement, whereby Dome Petroleum was required to
post bond to secure compensation to potential United States pollution victims, and the
Canadian Government guaranteed the sums of money involved. Gunther Handl, State
Liabilityfor Accidental TransnationalEnvironmental Damage by PrivatePersons, 74

AM. J. INT'L. L. 525, 547-8 (1980).
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In offering the following articles as a possible basis for negotiation,
the Group wishes to emphasize that it is the principles which are important, rather than the particular formulations presented. Above all, the
Group offers the proposition that equality of access and remedy in these
areas is a matter of essential justice. Regardless of the route chosen, it
commends to all the governments concerned the goal of achieving this
equality with as great dispatch as may be possible.
Article 1: Definitions
For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) "Pollution" means any introduction by man, directly
or indirectly, of substance or energy into the environment resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as
to endanger human health, harm living" resources or
eco-systems, impair amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the environment.
(b) "Domestic pollution" means any intentional or unintentional pollution, the physical origin of which is situated wholly within the area under the jurisdiction of one
Party and which has effects within that area only.
(c) "Transfrontier pollution" means any intentional or
unintentional pollution whose physical origin is subject
to, and situated wholly or in part within the area under
the jurisdiction of one Party and which has effects in the
area under the jurisdiction of the other Party.
(d) "Country of origin" means the Country within
which, and subject to the jurisdiction of which, transfrontier pollution originates or could originate in connection with activities carried on or contemplated in that
Country.
The Group has, as noted above, followed the OECD language adapting it only
4
insofar as is necessary to accommodate a bilateral situation. It observes, however, that if
the term "natural" were substituted for "living" the definition of pollution would be considerably broadened. This broadening might be desirable, given the importance to the
two States of their natural resources, such as national parks and monuments, which might
be affected by various polluting activities. Though it probably considered such possibilities, on balance the OECD Council chose the narrower term. Here, as elsewhere, the
Working Group has deferred, in presenting language, to the expertise of the OECD.
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(e) "Exposed Country" means the Country affected by
transfrontier pollution or exposed to a significant risk of
transfrontier pollution.
(f) "Persons" means any natural or legal person, either
private or public.
Comment. This Article defines the critical descriptive terms to be
used in the remainder of the treaty. It has already been noted that the
federal nature of the two countries complicates the coordination of laws.
Apart from the substantive differences between the legal systems of the
two countries, it could be that the various legislatures of each country
will use different definitions of operative terms in pollution legislation.
These divergent usages themselves could become subjects of disputes
and litigation, thus compounding the complications. Therefore, it is essential that the treaty should contain an agreed, neutral set of definitions
of all important words and phrases which would offer an effective guide
for legislation.
The use in subparagraph (a) of the term "effects" without further
modification is broad enough to permit recovery even in cases where the
original pollution is remote from the common border. For example, migratory birds or fish that summer in Canada might be harmed by a winter
oil spill off the coast of the southern United States near Mexico. It was
the understanding of the Group that the concept of equality of treatment
was not to be limited by geographical proximity to the common border,
and that recovery in such a situation would be appropriate, assuming, of
course, the injury were significant and could be directly traced to the
pollution. Thus, if a citizen of North Dakota has an action against a citizen of Texas, so also should a citizen of Manitoba who has been similarly injured. It must be noted, however, that the regime being proposed
here would not expand substantive remedies, for foreign nationals or for
domestic citizens. The proposed regime is strictly procedural; it has no
effect whatever on substantive rights or remedies in either country. It
would simply equalize the availability of the rights and remedies already
in existence or which may be established, for domestic purposes, in the
future.
Article 2: Rights of Persons Affected
(a) The Country of origin shall ensure that any natural or legal
person resident in the exposed Country, who has suffered transfrontier pollution damage or is exposed to a risk of transfrontier
pollution, shall at least receive equivalent treatment to that af-
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forded in the Country of origin, in cases of domestic pollution or
the risk thereof and in comparable circumstances, to persons of
equivalent condition or status resident in the Country of origin.
(b) From a procedural standpoint, this treatment shall include but
shall not be limited to the right to take part in, or have resort to,
all administrative and judicial procedures 45 existing within the
Country of origin, in order to prevent domestic pollution, to have
it abated, and/or to obtain compensation for the damage caused.
(c) In the case of requirements for security of cost, this treatment
shall at least be equivalent to that accorded to a non-resident national of the Country of origin.
Comment. This is the main operative provision of the Treaty. It ensures that the actual or potential victim of transfrontier pollution will
have a remedy in the courts of the polluter's residence, if a victim residing in the country of origin would have had a remedy in the case of domestic pollution. Paragraph (a) sets out the principle. It is so phrased
that the guarantee applies to remedies in state and provincial courts as
well as in federal ones. Paragraph (b) is a non-exhaustive enumeration
of the means through which and forms in which redress may be sought.
It subsumes injunctive and restorative relief insofar as such may be
available.
It should be noted that quasi-judicial administrative remedies are included. Primary domestic recourse is often by this route, particularly
where the issue is not existing pollution, but the approval of some proposed activity which may cause pollution in the future. In the long run,
the right to prevent harmful activity, through participation in such proceedings as administrative hearings on construction permits, is probably
a more important power than the right to after-the-fact recompense. A
grant of the latter but not the former would produce only illusory equality.
A connected issue that was considered by the Group, but not further
dealt with in this context, was the responsibility or immunity of international regulatory bodies such as the International Joint Commission,

45
Once again, the Group has followed the OECD text despite certain concerns about
its wording. As the Group understands the language, it is broad enough to include access
to proceedings for execution of a judgment, or for injunctive relief, if either were
necessary. If there should be any doubt on these points, it might be desirable to add to
this text explicit language to ensure that such matters would be covered.
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Proper arrangements

Article 3: Rights of Public and Private Organizations
(a)

(1) Where the domestic law of either Party or a political subdivision thereof permits persons who are resident or incorporated within its own territory, such as
environmental defense associations, to commence or
to participate in administrative and judicial procedures 46 to safeguard general environmental interests,
that Party or subdivision shall grant the same rights
for comparable matters to similar persons resident or
incorporated in the territory of the other Party, provided that these persons satisfy the conditions laid
down for persons resident or incorporated in the
Country of origin.
(2) When some of the conditions concerning matters of form laid down in the Country of origin
cannot reasonably be imposed on persons resident
or incorporated in the exposed Country, these latter should be entitled to commence proceedings in
the Country of origin if they satisfy comparable
conditions.

(b) When the law of a Party or a political subdivision thereof
permits a public authority to participate in administrative or judicial procedures in order to safeguard general environmental interests, that Party shall provide competent public authorities of the
exposed Country with equivalent access to such procedures.
Comment. This Article enables public and private environmental
groups in one country to have the same right to protect the general environmental interests of their country in the courts or administrative chambers of the other as comparable groups in the latter have. The establishment of this principle is especially important for the avoidance of inter' Here, and throughout the text, the term "procedures" has been substituted for
"proceedings" in the OECD text, on the ground that "procedures" is more inclusive and
therefore preferable.

ABA & CBA-Settlement ofInternationalDisputes Between Canada and the USA

79

governmental disputes. The sort of case with which an environmental
group will be concerned is likely to be damage to wilderness areas, or
pervasive pollution whose effect on any given individual is small, subtle,
or very long term. Such a case is often the kind where, if relief is not
sought or forthcoming early on, increasing damage can escalate the matter into a major public issue, which then becomes a dispute between the
governments themselves. Had present-day substantive rights existed at
the time these cases arose, the situations in the Trail Smelter, Gut Dam,
and Garrison Diversion cases might have been alleviated at earlier stages
or avoided entirely by the existence of an agreement along the lines of
the present article.
Moreover, the knowledge, vigilance, and foresight of public interest
groups make them likely candidates to take advantage of the opportunity
to be heard at inquiries into the environmental impact of, for example,
proposed new land development or changes in existing land use. Thus,
planners and policy makers in both countries will be encouraged to give
equal consideration to transfrontier and domestic effects of pollutioncausing activities. The more this is done, the less use will need to be
made of the private remedies for pollution damage provided in this treaty.
The rights of access for foreign public bodies granted by paragraph
(b) may be additionally useful to ensure that suits in one country's courts
are not used to further peculiar and unrepresentative interests of a foreign
plaintiff, which interests may be inimical to his or its own country's general interests. In other words, among other purposes, this paragraph is
directed at countering an attempt by a person in one country to use the
other Party's courts to further his interests to the disadvantage of others in
his own country.
Many legislative provisions giving standing to environmental organizations contain formal requirements specifying the type or characteristics of the organization, its by-laws, finances, and membership. These
are usually designed to ensure the genuineness and responsibility of the
organization. These requirements are commonly in terms of that jurisdiction's own corporation and tax laws. Sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this
Article requires each Party to take account of variation in such formal
laws, and to permit a foreign group to have standing if it meets substantively equivalent standards of good faith and representation in the jurisdiction of its origin.
Article 4: Notice to Persons in the Exposed Country
(a) The Country of origin shall take any appropriate measures to
provide persons exposed to a significant risk of transfrontier pol-
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lution with notice sufficient in form and content to enable them to
exercise in a timely manner the rights referred to in this Treaty.
As far as possible, such notice should be at least equivalent to that
provided in the Country of origin in cases of comparable domestic pollution. It shall be sent also to any authority designated for
this purpose by the exposed Country.
(b) The exposed Country may designate one or more authorities
which will have the duty to receive and the responsibility to disseminate such notice within limits of time compatible with the
exercise of existing procedures in the Country of origin.
(c) Where such an authority has been designated, notification to
it shall constitute fulfillment of the obligation of the Country of
origin under paragraph (a). Failure of the exposed Country to
designate an authority under paragraph (b) in no way affects the
obligation of the Country of origin under paragraph (a).
Comment. This Article ensures that each Party will have sufficient
information from the other so that the residents of the exposed country
may make full and effective use of all remedies available. Although the
article does not require notice for every risk of pollution, no matter how
small, the term "significant" is meant to modify the entire phrase, "risk
of transfrontier pollution," not just the word "risk." Thus, notice would
be required of a small risk of significant pollution (e.g., from nuclear
reactors), as well as a significant risk of relatively little pollution.
Notices of hearings on discharge permits, construction proposals,
and zoning variances are often given in government releases of limited
distribution or in periodicals of local circulation. In the United States,
the environmental impact statement has become an important source of
advance information on proposed projects. The form and content of notice is usually prescribed by statute to ensure that the domestic persons
concerned will know that they have a chance to be heard. In particular,
domestic environmental groups have become skilled at keeping abreast
of opportunities for action. Persons and groups across the border, however, may not have access to this news network. This article requires
that they be given special notice sufficient to allow them an equal opportunity to act.
Statutory and common-law remedies sometimes are conditioned on
certain actions by the plaintiff to perfect his rights or to prevent them
from lapsing. Finally, unusual or innovative rights and remedies are
sometimes not used because the public is unfamiliar with them.
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Article 5: Limitation of Rights Granted
In no event shall the provisions of this Treaty be construed as
granting, per se, any greater rights to persons resident or incorporated in the exposed Country than those enjoyed by persons
of equivalent condition or status resident or incorporated in the
Country of origin.
Comment. This provision is designed to ensure that the Treaty does
not inadvertently put the nationals of the other State in a better position
to enforce pollution laws than the citizens of the first State. It should be
noted, however, that this limitation applies only within the confines of
the Treaty. The Group has already alluded to the fact that its proposals
are not in any way addressed to the substantive law to be applied in
transfrontier cases. The proposed regime is not intended to have any
effect whatever on relevant private international law or common law
rules or to increase or decrease in any way rights which foreign nationals
have under existing law. In particular, the Group notes that there may be
situations where the transfrontier effects of pollution are greater than the
domestic ones. In these cases, the parties may wish to come to some
special ad hoc agreement.
The regime of access and equality of remedy described in the preceding articles would put all persons in both countries on a level footing in
any pollution proceeding in either country. However, if the standard in
the forum jurisdiction is considerably lower than those in surrounding
jurisdictions, the equality may be of limited value. In the long run, the
judicial regime suggested here would be more valuable if a common
minimum standard could be agreed on, one which would give substantive meaning in all situations to the principle of equality. Thus, the legislative and regulatory coordination discussed at the beginning of Part II
might be able to contribute to the avoidance of private as well as public
disputes.
2. Inter-Governmental Arbitration
The domestic courts of the two countries are thus seen to be systems
in place for the resolution of private transfrontier disputes. All that is
required is some adjustment and coordination to build upon and improve
those systems. But for public or inter-Governmental disputes there is no
system in place which can assure a definitive resolution. One may well
ask, why is any system for binding settlement of such questions necessary, or even appropriate. The preceding sections have shown the relationship of the two nations to be among the most cordial in the world.
The give and take of negotiation and consultation, of offer and bargain
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proceed almost constantly, sometimes supplemented by mixed or factfinding commissions. These processes have served the two countries
well in most instances. But they do not always work. When they do not,
there is no effective recourse. Disputes which will not yield to negotiation, often the most difficult or troubling ones, are usually left to heal or
fester on their own. In simpler times, this neglect might have been acceptable. But today, United States-Canadian relations are extremely
complex and become ever more convoluted and interwoven.47 If the
relationship is to be kept manageable, there must be a way of getting
definitive answers to these difficult problems. Only a binding third-party
settlement procedure can provide this assurance. Because of the two
countries' success in negotiations, binding procedures are possible. Because of their negotiating failures, binding procedures are necessary.
The Group proposes that an arbitration system be created to fill the
need for an available mechanism for binding settlement. This proposal is
not a call to litigation or an endorsement of litigiousness. It calls for
compulsory arbitration in a single but important category of fundamental
legal disputes: those relating to treaty interpretation. The proposal is thus
an appeal for a mutual commitment to the final authority of law in the
government of the two countries' affairs. A common legal and political
heritage and the basic trust of which unguarded common borders are
evidence make such a commitment uniquely appropriate. A functioning
system of settlement can provide a model for other countries which are
not able to resolve differences amicably. 48 It can provide an objective
affirmation of the vitality of North American governmental traditions
and a refutation of those who are skeptical of their continued validity.
It was noted in Part II that arbitration and judicial settlement are the
two techniques available for the definitive resolution of legal disputes
47 The increasing complexity in Canada-United States relations has most recently
been evidenced by Canada's refusal to join the United Kingdom in the Iraq War, revealing fundamental differences in international outlook and foreign policy. This divergence
is not unprecedented. For example, following the Clinton administration's enactment of
the Helms-Burton Law, strengthening the United States embargo against Cuba, Canada
passed the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act to counter the effects of the United
States law. John Herd Thompson, Playing by the New Washington Rules: the US. CanadaRelationship, 1994-2003, 33 AM. REV. CANADIAN STUD. 5 (2003).
48 The NAFTA's dispute resolution provisions in Chapter 20 have been regarded as
models for other free trade agreements. See generally Erik B. Wang, Adjudication of
Canada-United States Disputes, 19 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 158 (1981) (discussing the
Report of the American and Canadian Bar Associations' Joint Working Group 1979 and
its purpose and importance); see also American Bar Association Section of International
Law, http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/intlproj/home.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (stating the American Bar Associations eighth institutional goal is "to promote the rule of law
in the world").

ABA & CBA-Settlement ofinternationalDisputes Between Canada and the USA

83

between States. Because arbitration is an ad hoc procedure, the parties
retain control over the composition and procedure of the panel for each
case, thus giving it the advantages of flexibility and relative informality.
The structure of an arbitral tribunal can be designed to suit the needs of a
particular case. Its procedure can be as simple and uncluttered as the
facts of the case permit. Arbitration is a procedure that guarantees that
issues are kept self-contained and are dealt with on their own merits,
without "linkage" to other bilateral issues. It therefore accommodates
the widely held view that in complex bilateral relations it is unwise to
"trade off' the interests of different groups and regions. Judicial settlement on the other hand has the advantages of ease of reference and of
relative predictability. Since the court is already in existence, proceedings may go forward rapidly once the court is seized of a dispute. Over
time, a permanent court will develop its own jurisprudence, and the details of its procedure will become regularized. The parties will therefore
be able to have some idea prior to submission of the way the court will
treat a given question.
Considering the history of informal, ad hoc contacts between the
United States and Canada and the multitude of questions of potential
common concern, the arbitral style seems best suited to their needs.
However, since the procedure is for the sole use of two nations with a
common legal tradition, it may be possible to build into it also some advantages of a judicial system, without its rigidity. This has been done by
the careful specification of applicable law based on explicitly shared
values, by offering a custom-designed judicial chamber as a secondary
alternative to arbitration, and by giving the parties the option to use arbitration to obtain legal advice to aid them in negotiating settlements.
Even in simpler times, the two countries have found it difficult to
agree on a settlement procedure after a dispute has arisen. Even though a
procedure has been available in the International Joint Commission for
dealing with certain categories of disputes, no agreement was ever
reached on utilizing the arbitral powers of the Commission in a concrete
case. In several cases, when they agreed to resort to arbitration, it usually required complex negotiations to design from scratch the desired arbitral procedure. The I'm Alone, Trail Smelter, and Gut Dam cases are
three comparatively recent examples. As relations become more complicated it becomes ever more important that a fully elaborated arbitration
system be put in place, for use as and when it is required.
Although an arbitration system, once created, may simplify relations,
we recognize that different perceptions of the problems involved in establishing it bear upon the very decision to adopt it. It is our belief that
contemplation of such a decision will be made easier by the availability
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of a concrete proposal. In this spirit, the Group offers articles to the two
Governments as a possible basis for joint consideration and negotiation.
Article 1: Compulsory Jurisdiction
In any dispute between the States Parties, any question of interpretation, application or operation of a treaty in force between
them, which has not been settled within a reasonable time by direct
negotiations or referred by agreement of the Parties to the International Court of Justice or to some other third-party procedure, shall
be submitted to third-party settlement at the written request of either Party addressed to the other's cabinet officer in charge of foreign affairs, or by an exchange of notes between the two.
Comment. This is the main jurisdictional clause. It provides that a
certain category of questions (those which relate to the interpretation or
application of a treaty) may be submitted to arbitration by the unilateral
request of one of the two Parties, without the advance agreement of the
other. This compulsory jurisdiction is strictly limited to that one category: treaty interpretation, application, and operation. It can be invoked
only when the question relates to a treaty binding on both countries. As
of 1 January 1979, there were some 200 treaties in force between them,
counting both multilateral and bilateral instruments. They cover subjects
from aeronautical research to zoology; and the number and variety grow
annually.
The article has been carefully worded so that the arbitral jurisdiction
is compulsory only as to the treaty question itself. In mixed disputes
involving non-treaty legal questions or non-legal questions, compulsory
jurisdiction will not extend to these other matters. The tribunal should be
able to deal with non-treaty legal issues only to the extent that they are
essential to a proper resolution of the treaty issues; the Group understands this to be implied in the draft provision on applicable law (Article
8, infra). It must be noted further that Article 4(2) follows the normal
practice, both international and domestic, of leaving the precise limits of
the tribunal's jurisdiction for the tribunal itself to decide. International
tribunals have developed a fairly substantial and consistent jurisprudence
in reference to similar jurisdictional clauses.
The Group recognizes that, as in the case of the legal/non-legal distinction already discussed, it may often be difficult to excise the treaty
question from the rest of the dispute for separate analysis. But here again
the Group believes that the problem is more theoretical than real. Municipal tribunals, especially appellate courts with constitutional jurisdiction, are often asked to consider matters of statutory interpretation in
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isolation from the central issues of a dispute. And the International
Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the European Communities
are among international tribunals which have performed similar functions. Moreover, the Group has drawn a definite line around treaty questions in an attempt to be modest in its proposals, to suggest something
that is politically feasible. There is no juristic or other legal reason why
such a line would have to be held in practice, were it not for the parties'
likely concern about keeping compulsory jurisdiction tightly circumscribed.
It is a matter of long-standing and widespread agreement among
States that treaty interpretation or application is an especially apt subject
for international adjudication. The Hague Convention of 1899 for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes stated in Article 16 that arbitration was the most equitable means of settling "questions of a legal
nature, [especially those relating to] the interpretation or application of
international conventions" (Article 38 of the 1907 Hague Convention is
identical in this respect). The "interpretation of a treaty" was one of the
main categories of legal disputes listed as suitable for arbitration and
judicial settlement in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and is given a prominent position in the optional clause contained
in Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
The term "treaty" is to be taken in the broad sense used by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, including any kind of international agreement. On the other hand, it does not apply to agreements not
involving the Governments of the two countries, excluding therefore
compacts between states and provinces, or agreements involving public
corporations or government-owned entities.
The terms "interpretation" and "application" are those customarily
used in special compromissory clauses to describe the types of questions
which arise under treaties. The intent of using both is to make sure that
jurisdictional objections cannot be raised on the ground either that a
question is too connected with the actual working of the treaty to be regarded simply as a matter of interpretation, or that it is so abstract as not
to be one of application. The difference between them in practice may
be quite small, however, as most disputes involve both interpretation and
application. To indicate emphasis of the fact that jurisdiction extends to
any problem which may arise with respect to treaty language, the term
"operation" is added here as well. Most recently, this wording has been
incorporated into Article 9 of the 1977 United States-Canadian Transit
Pipeline Treaty.
This special position of treaty interpretation is probably due in part to
the fact that a treaty contains only rules which have been agreed upon by
the parties. Compulsory jurisdiction over its interpretation does not ex-
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pose a party to prejudice through the submission of domestic issues, of
questions which it has not considered as governed by international law,
or of those for which international law provides only obscure or ambiguous answers. It merely provides an impartial and authoritative way of
ascertaining the meaning and effect of terms to which both parties have
already subscribed.
Treaties, particularly bilateral agreements, between Canada and the
United States comprise the law for the two countries. Some commentators liken treaties to international "statutes." Others see them as interstate contracts. In either case, the two countries are both committed to
the binding force of their provisions. And they have a strong tradition of
judicial recourse in the case of domestic differences over statutory or
contractual interpretation.
Through historical development or implicit common understanding,
some treaties or treaty provisions may no longer be properly given strict
legal effect. The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 is perhaps the classic
example of an extant treaty with more symbolic value than literal enforceability. Article IV of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, containing
a broad antipollution provision, may be another example. But such instruments are not, therefore, necessarily inappropriate for international
adjudication. The precepts of international jurisprudence require an arbitral panel to interpret any treaty in light of all the relevant circumstances,
including historical development and implicit understandings. The Parties are thus protected from an overly "legalistic" reading of a treaty.
Nevertheless, there may be instruments or parts thereof which the Parties
may not wish to have made subject to the general grant of compulsory
jurisdiction. If this proves to be the case, excluded provisions could be
listed in an annex to which Article I could refer. Accordingly, Article 1
could be revised to add after "in force between them," the clause "except
those treaties or parts thereof listed in Annex A to the present Treaty."
Alternatively, such an annex might list the treaties to be covered by Article 1. In this case, the words "in force between them" could be replaced
by "listed in Annex A to the present Convention."
If it does prove necessary to restrict the generality of Article 1, the
Group would recommend the first alternative. Moreover, it would recommend keeping the list of excluded instruments as short as possible.
Regardless of initial commitments, the ultimate success of a third-party
settlement system will depend upon its ability to build governmental and
public confidence, to show that the system is even-handed and that the
Parties are on a footing of equality. While arbitration or adjudication
does not by any means always produce a "winner" and a "loser," any
given decision may be more favorable to one side's position than the
other. If the range of arbitral or judicial jurisdiction is severely limited,
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the net effect will be very few decisions on a restricted set of instruments. In this situation, the arbitral record may look one-sided, due not
to the nature of the system, but rather to the limited subject matters of the
chosen instruments. Thus, an excessively modest grant of jurisdiction
may result in the apparent confirmation of the concerns which prompted
the caution in the first place. General compulsory jurisdiction is especially appropriate for Canada and the United States in large part because
their mutual treaties are many and varied. If arbitration or adjudication is
permitted to range over this entire field, the favor which either State may
find in any particular decision will be balanced by favor to the other
State in other decisions. The net result will then properly reflect the
equality and fairness inherent in genuine third-party proceedings.
It is worth emphasizing that the article does specify arbitration only
as a last resort. Negotiation is explicitly recognized as a normal first
step. Moreover, the parties are required to devote a reasonable time to
these negotiations in a serious attempt to resolve the matter bilaterally.
The two States can also agree to refer the dispute at any time to any special fact-finding or other procedure, such as the International Joint
Commission. Even in treaty interpretation, arbitration is to be reserved
for those cases where other procedures cannot bring the parties all the
way to settlement.
The Group considered the possibility of limiting jurisdiction under
Article 1 to bilateral treaties. It decided, however, to include multilateral
treaties as well, particularly having regard to the fact that an increasing
number of essentially bilateral questions are regulated by general international agreements of a codificatory nature. Examples include the Vienna
Conventions on the Law of Diplomatic and Consular Relations and on
the Law of Treaties, and the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions. Presumably, if a case under such an instrument should involve third parties, the
United States and Canada would go to some other procedure or make
some ad hoc arrangement for the adaptation of the presently proposed
system to accommodate others.
It must be noted, however, that the provisions of some multilateral
treaties may effectively preclude use of the present procedure. Some
multilateral treaties to which both Canada and the United States are parties specify exclusive means of compulsory settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of these treaties. This is done
to ensure consistent interpretation of the instrument where different pairs
of parties to the treaty may be involved in essentially the same dispute at
different times. In the case of such a treaty, provided that the procedure
specified therein is genuinely compulsory and results in a binding decision, the two governments must have recourse to it through the multilateral jurisdictional clause, rather than to arbitration through the present
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article. Examples of such treaties are the Bretton Woods Agreements on
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the various international commodity agreements, where the international organization
constituted by the document has sole authority over its interpretation.
There might also be certain bilateral agreements which would fall into
this group. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty might be an example.
Other multilateral treaties specify a binding procedure for interpretation but allow the parties to resort to another procedure at their option.
An example is the Universal Copyright Convention, calling for reference
to the International Court of Justice absent agreement to the contrary. In
disputes between Canada and the United States over such a treaty, Article 1 of the present treaty can be considered as an exercise of this option,
and the Plaintiff would be obliged to resort in such a case to arbitration in
accordance with the present treaty. Other provisions of multilateral treaties may be interpreted as granting the "plaintiff' the choice of resorting
to the jurisdictional clause in these treaties or to arbitration under the
present treaty. The Convention establishing the International Maritime
Consultative Organization allows reference either to the Assembly of
that organization or to an agreed procedure.
Compulsory settlement in regard to still other multilateral instruments is provided for in a separate optional protocol to which only one of
our two States is a party. This category would include the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. In
such a case, the complaining government would have to seek redress
under the present treaty.
Article I should be read in light of Article 10 concerning advisory
opinions. The comment to that article notes that the governments may
wish to use the advisory procedure when a treaty interpretation question
is involved in private litigation in one of the two countries.
Article 2: Optional Jurisdiction
(1) Any other dispute between the States Parties relating to a
question or principle of international law may be submitted to
third-party settlement by special agreement between the Parties.
Without limiting the generality of this principle, the Parties regard
disputes concerning the following matters as particularly appropriate subjects for such special agreements:
(a) pecuniary claims in respect of losses or damage sustained by one of the Parties or its nationals as a result of
acts or omissions of, or attributable to, the other Party;
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(b) immunities of States and of their agencies and subdivisions;
(c) privileges and immunities of Heads of States, Foreign
Ministers and other high officials;
(d) diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities;
(e) treatment of the other Party's nationals;
(f) environmental issues;
(g) the management of natural resources of common interest; and
(h) transnational application of civil and criminal laws.
(2) The special agreements referred to in the previous paragraph
shall, for each case or group of cases, become effective through
an exchange of diplomatic notes without any legislative action.
Comment. Paragraph 1 makes clear that all legal disputes not subject to compulsory jurisdiction under Article 1 may be submitted to thirdparty settlement only through an ad hoc agreement of both countries. On
the other hand, the first sentence of the paragraph also makes clear that
any legal dispute is an appropriate subject for arbitration or adjudication
by agreement.
It seems useful to include in the paragraph a non-exhaustive list of
international legal questions, in order to give some idea of the range of
cases where third-party settlement might be employed. The subjects
listed are some of those which have often been submitted to arbitration or
adjudication in the past. For the most part, they are areas where customary or conventional international law is relatively well settled and easily
ascertainable. In addition, a reference has been made to environmental
issues, which are of particular concern to citizens on both sides of the
boundary.
The Group considered that the outstanding maritime boundary questions between the two countries might also be added to the list. This has
not been done for the moment, however, in deference to any procedure
that might be proposed as a result of the Cutler-Cadieux negotiations,
which were under way while the present draft was being developed.
The first item listed is pecuniary claims by the citizens of one State
against the other; Claims "attributable to" a State will include those
against any of its constituent federal subdivisions. The periodic refer-

90

CANADA-UNITED STATESLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 35, Nos. 1 & 2]

ence of a large number of claims to a special bilateral commission has
for many years been one of the most common uses of international arbitration. Despite the fact that both States have done so several times in
the past, there has not been a mutual submission of United States and
Canadian claims to a general commission since 1910. The only recent
group of claims submitted to arbitration were the special claims connected with the Gut Dam.
Submission of claims such as those described in paragraph 1(a)
would be made only after exhaustion by each claimant of the local remedies in the other State, if appropriate remedies are available. Indeed, a
regime of equality of remedies such as that proposed for transfrontier
pollution cases in the previous section would do much to reduce the
number of claims being lodged. Exhaustion of local remedies is a generally recognized rule of international law, covering all cases which may
properly be resolved by reference to domestic courts. Absent explicit
agreement to the contrary between the Parties, an international tribunal
will automatically apply this rule in any dispute involving private claims.
The second paragraph of Article 2 is addressed to the fact that the
timing of the agreement to arbitrate may be crucial. There often comes a
time in the life of a dispute when it seems "ripe" for settlement. If, at
such a point, arbitration appears to be the best method of resolution, the
submission should proceed as expeditiously as possible. To facilitate
that, it is specified that an exchange of diplomatic notes will be sufficient
to make the submission. No legislative action is required. There are
precedents for this sort of legislative authorization of further executive
agreements in situations like GATT where it is anticipated that implementation of general principles will take place through numerous small
agreements.
Article 3: Organization of Third-Party Settlement
Unless the Parties otherwise agree in a particular case, thirdparty settlement pursuant to Article 1 or Article 2 above shall be
organized in each case as follows:
(a) Within 60 days either of the receipt by the other Party of the request for third-party settlement or of the date
of signature of a special agreement, as the case may be,
each of the Parties shall appoint one member of the arbitral tribunal. Within a further period of sixty days the
Parties shall, by common agreement, select a third person who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. If no
agreement is reached on the selection of a Chairman
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within this period, either Party may request the President
of the International Court of Justice to make the appointment. If the latter is prevented from acting or is a
national of one of the Parties, the nomination shall be
made by the Vice-president of the Court. If the latter is
prevented from acting or is a national of one of the Parties, the appointment shall be made by the senior judge
of the Court who is not a national of either Party. The
time limits specified in this paragraph may be extended
or shortened by agreement of the Parties.
(b) If, for any reason, a tribunal is not constituted pursuant to the previous paragraph within 120 days of the receipt of the request for arbitration or of the date of signature of the arbitral agreement, either Party may, by written application, submit the dispute to the International
Court of Justice, to be decided by a Chamber thereof
composed in accordance with the following paragraph.
The acceptance by the Parties of the jurisdiction of the
Court and its special Chamber is subject to the condition
that the Chamber has been established in accordance
with that paragraph.
(c) The Parties agree that either of them will be authorized to request, at the time of submitting a dispute to the
Court, that the Court form a Chamber for consideration
of the case pursuant to Article 26(2) of the court's Statute and Articles 17 and 18 of its Rules, consisting of
three judges, one national of Canada, one of the United
States, and one of another State to be agreed upon by the
Parties. If, at the time of application, one of the States
Parties does not have a national on the Court, it shall,
pursuant to Article 31(2) of the court's Statute, nominate
a person to sit as judge. If there is no agreement between the Parties on the third member of the Chamber
within thirty days of the submission to the Court of an
application pursuant to the previous paragraph, or if a
Party with no national on the Court does not nominate a
person to sit as judge within such time, that member or
those members shall be elected by the Court from among
its members. In any such case the Parties may jointly
request that any election be made from among judges
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coming from a particular geographical region or representing a particular legal system or tradition.
(d) Vacancies which may occur in an arbitral tribunal
composed according to paragraph (a) above shall be
filled in such manner as provided for original appointments. Vacancies occurring in the Chamber of the Court
established pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) above
shall be filled in accordance with the Statute and Rules
of the Court.
Comment. This article provides for the constitution of the arbitral or
judicial panel to be used to resolve disputes submitted either under Article 1 or Article 2. By including disputes under Article 2 (absent other
provision in the compromis), it is hoped that the conclusion of special
agreements will be simplified and thus encouraged. The availability of a
pre-established appointment procedure should eliminate one possible
subject of contention which would otherwise have to be discussed after
the dispute had already arisen.
In the typical case, a dispute will be submitted to a three-member ad
hoc arbitral tribunal. This configuration was seen as well suited to the
situation of the two countries and the nature of many of their differences.
The two countries' history of friendly settlement in good faith and their
cultural, legal, and political similarity would seem to make it unnecessary in most cases to have the majority of neutral members so often required as a buffer in less cordial situations. In certain instances, however, the Parties may wish to establish bodies of different sizes. For example, a complex dispute which involves differing regional and national
interests on both sides may call for a five-member tribunal so that the
various positions could properly be represented. Indeed, the Group notes
that the five-member panel with three neutral members seems to have
been enjoying considerable favor recently. While the Group still feels
that one neutral will usually be sufficient (and less expensive), it also
finds the five-member panel with three neutrals to be quite an acceptable
alternative. If the governments chose this form as the normal mode, minor drafting changes in the proposed texts will be required.
Reference of a large number and broad range of disputes to a single
panel might justify an even larger membership: seven or perhaps even
nine.
In making the appointments to tribunals, the Parties may wish to involve senior members of their domestic judiciaries, either on a consultative basis or by actually giving them the power of selection. Certain cases might call for advice from other officials, e.g., cabinet officers or ap-

ABA & CBA-Settlement ofInternationalDisputes Between Canadaand the USA

93

propriate representatives of state or provincial governments. The ad hoc
selection process makes it possible for concerned constituencies to play a
role. They should be encouraged to do so, as such participation will
broaden support for the use of arbitration, and at the same time increase
the likelihood that decisions of the tribunals will be acceptable to those
most affected.
It will usually be a great advantage to have a body of ad hoc judges
composed of persons who have special familiarity with the facts or background of a given case or who possess expertise uniquely relevant to its
solution. However, there may be situations where the Parties will wish
to have a problem considered by a panel with more distance and detachment from the development of the dispute. In response to this eventuality, paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 3 offer the possibility of submission
to a specially constituted three-member Chamber of the International
Court of Justice. By letting either Party resort to this standing body after
a certain period, this alternative ensures that the dispute settlement process will not be frustrated by the failure to complete an ad hoc tribunal.
One national of each Party shall serve as a judge in the Chamber.
The identification of the third judge has been left to the ad hoc agreement
of the two governments. They may wish to have a common law expert.
On the other hand, a dispute might concern questions of civil law, which
prevails in certain areas of the two countries. In such a case, the Parties
might designate a judge from a civil law State as the third member.
There may even be special cases where the Parties would prefer the perspective or expertise of a representative of a non-European legal tradition.
Where the Parties cannot agree on the choice of a third judge, the
appointment will be made by the Court in accordance with its rules.
Even where a specific judge cannot be agreed upon, the governments
will probably be able to designate generally the geographic areas or legal
systems which should or should not be represented. Paragraph (c) encourages the governments to pass on such a general agreement to the
Court.
This Chamber of the Court, as it is used periodically over the years,
might develop what could be considered a "North American jurisprudence." Such a body of law would give the Parties a common frame of
reference, encouraging further resort to the legal method of settlement of
disputes between them.
The court's Rules of Procedure, as adopted on 14 April 1978, make
it possible for the parties to a dispute to exercise virtually complete control over the size and composition of a Chamber for a given case. One is,
of course, limited to the membership of the Court, except for the possibility of ad hoc national judges; and the final decisions on the makeup of
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the Chamber are with the Court itself pursuant to Article 18 of the Rules.
Therefore, paragraph (b) of Article 3 makes it clear that the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court will not come into being if it does not assemble
the Chamber according to the Parties' request. It may be noted in passing that Article 32(1) of the Rules of Court, when read with Article 18(2)
and (3), effectively seems to imply neither of the national judges of the
Parties may be elected to preside over the Chamber.
Paragraph (d) ensures that an unexpected vacancy on the tribunal or
Chamber will not affect its balance.
Article 4: Competence
(1) The arbitral tribunal or the Chamber of the Court constituted
in accordance with Article 3 shall have jurisdiction in any question or dispute submitted to it in accordance with the provisions
of this Treaty.
(2) Any disagreement (a) as to whether such tribunal or Chamber
has jurisdiction under this Treaty or any agreement concluded
pursuant thereto, or (b) as to the extent of such jurisdiction, shall
be settled by the decision of that tribunal or Chamber.
Comment. This is a routine provision in arbitration treaties although
one of considerable importance. Paragraph 1 merely articulates the fact
that any properly constituted body has the competence to decide any
properly submitted questions. Paragraph 2 gives the arbitral body the
power of decision when its competence to decide is the very point in
issue. In fact, this power probably flows by operation of law from the
fact that this instrument and compromis concluded under it are treaties
themselves. Thus, jurisdictional questions under them-such as whether
or not there was a treaty on a particular subject or whether the question
submitted properly related to its interpretation, application, or operation-would themselves be questions of treaty interpretation. Therefore,
for all the reasons set out in the comment on Article 1 above, they are
quite properly objects of compulsory jurisdiction. Paragraph 2 is inserted here just to make doubly sure that this point is clear. In the opinion of
the Group, this jurisdiction over jurisdiction, so-called competence de la
competence, is essential to the effective operation of the third-party settlement system.
As is always true where jurisdiction is limited or circumscribed by an
agreement, there are going to be borderline cases, situations where the
Parties will disagree about whether a problem is within or outside of
those limits. Considering the particular limits of the jurisdictional claus-
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es proposed above, such a disagreement may concern the question of
whether a dispute has or has not been settled by direct negotiations,
whether a given instrument is or is not a treaty, whether it is or is not in
force, or whether an issue is within the terms of the special agreement to
arbitrate. Unless the final settlement of such points is left to the tribunal
itself, resolution of the substantive dispute can be delayed, sometimes
indefinitely, by jurisdictional disagreements between the Parties.
Article 5: Provisional Measures
(1) An arbitral tribunal which considers prima facie that it has jurisdiction under this Treaty or an agreement concluded pursuant
thereto shall have the power to prescribe, by order, any provisional measures which it considers appropriate to preserve the respective rights of the Parties pending final adjudication.
(2) Such provisional measures may only be prescribed, modified
or revoked upon the request of a Party and after giving both an
opportunity to be heard.
(3) Each order issued pursuant to this Article shall specify the
time during which it is to be in effect, which in no case shall be
longer than six months. Either Party may apply to the tribunal for
renewal of an order issued pursuant to this Article.
(4) Any order prescribing, modifying or revoking provisional
measures shall be notified forthwith to Parties who shall promptly
comply therewith.
Comment. Once again, this is a routine provision, found in almost
all statutes of international tribunals or codes of arbitral procedure. The
necessity of the power to grant provisional relief is implicit in the initial
decision of the Parties to submit to binding settlement. By this decision,
they have agreed that their actions with respect to the matter in question
will ultimately be regulated by the decision of the tribunal. For such a
commitment to have meaning, the Parties must in the meantime be willing to have the tribunal indicate what acts of forbearance are necessary to
avoid foreclosing an effective decision on the merits of the case.
Paragraph 3 ensures that provisional orders of indefinite duration are
not made, as such orders might have the effect of encouraging one of the
parties to delay the movement of the case toward judgment. Every six
months, the tribunal must completely reconsider the advisability of provisional measures, in light of then current circumstances and the expeditious conduct of the case.
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The Article applies only to ad hoc tribunals formed under paragraph
(a) of Article 3. The Chamber of the International Court of Justice would
have a similar power under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court.
Article 6: Location of Proceedings
(1) Arbitration proceedings commenced at the request of one
Party shall take place in the capital of the other Party, unless the
Parties otherwise agree.
(2) Arbitration proceedings commenced by agreement of the Parties shall take place at a location determined either (a) by the Parties' agreement, or (b) in default thereof by the tribunal itself.
(3) Where a dispute is submitted to a Chamber of the Court pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 3, the Parties may request that the Chamber sit at the capital of one of the Parties.
(4) The tribunal hearing a case may hold proceedings at locations
other than its principal seat as and when the circumstances of the
case make it desirable.
Comment. The first paragraph of this Article provides in effect that
the Party which submits a dispute to arbitration should grant the "defendant" the advantage of having the proceedings conducted on its territory. Articles 22(1) and 28 of the Statute of the Court would permit its
Chamber to sit in either of the two countries.
Because the two countries are located on the North American continent, a neutral venue in another part of the world would be neither economical nor efficient. In the typical case, both personnel and evidentiary
material will be available most easily in one of the two capitals. It seems
most equitable, where other things are equal, to require the Party who is
initiating proceedings to take its case to the capital of the other. The
Parties can, of course, override the rule of paragraph I if the circumstances of a case make some other venue advisable. It has been suggested, for example, that the North American headquarters of international
organizations to which both countries belong, such as the World Bank's
Center for the Settlement of Disputes or the International Civil Aviation
Organization, might fill the need for a neutral venue. Or the Parties may
wish to have the proceedings held alternately in each capital. In cases of
arbitration by agreement, the Parties would presumably settle the question of venue as a routine part of the compromis.
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Paragraph 4 is a standard provision which flows from the prerogative
of a tribunal to make orders during a case concerning its conduct. One
can easily imagine situations where it would be desirable for special
hearings to be held somewhere other than at the regular seat of the tribunal. It could happen, for example, that the tribunal would be called upon
to take testimony from numerous residents of a given locale. In another
case, the tribunal might find it necessary to inspect first hand some geographic conditions or other local situations.
Article 7: Conduct of Proceedings
(1) An arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with paragraph
(a) of Article 3 shall function in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure annexed to this Treaty, unless the Parties should otherwise agree.
(2) At the request of a Party, the tribunal may call upon any
agency, subdivision or national of either Party to appear to give
evidence or testimony, provided that the tribunal may not hear or
receive evidence or testimony pursuant to this paragraph without
the consent of the Party whose agency, subdivision or national is
being called.
(3) A Chamber of the Court formed pursuant to paragraphs (b)
and (c) of Article 3 shall function in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Statute and Rules of the Court, unless the
Parties should, by common agreement, request otherwise.
Comment. This article incorporates by reference the relevant procedural and administrative provisions for the organization and conduct of
arbitration. These provisions, which are for the most part formal and
uncontroversial, provide for such matters as a registry to record proceedings and to facilitate the following: communications between Parties and
tribunal; schedule and format of written and oral pleadings; remuneration
of arbitrators and division of expenses of the tribunal, quorum, and required majority for decision; form and content of judgments and separate, dissenting opinions.
Where specially designed permanent or ad hoc bodies are contemplated, as in the present Treaty, these procedural matters are usually covered by a set of rules annexed to the main instrument. A set of such rules
is included as Annex C to this report. These rules provide an ample opportunity for both parties to raise issues of concern to them. One unusual
provision in those rules, relating to the method of reaching a decision,
should be noted here. Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the annexed draft spec-
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ifies that decisions of an arbitral tribunal "shall ordinarily be reached by
consensus." According to current United Nations practice, a consensus
exists with respect to a particular decision when no member of the deciding body has objections serious enough to force a vote. Thus, only
where no consensus can be achieved is a vote to be taken. This preliminary effort at consensus may be expected in most cases to avoid a divisive vote. If the experience of such bodies as the International Joint
Commission is any indication, the members of a small, well-qualified
group appointed by the two governments will often be able to agree
among themselves. Thus, while a binding decision is still guaranteed, it
will be made in as amicable a fashion as possible. While the Group
notes that these consensus decisions may be somewhat less rigorous legally than a majority decision and may not be good precedents for others
to follow, it considers that wherever it can be achieved mutual satisfaction is paramount.
One other important procedural point is set out as paragraph 2 of the
present Article itself. It was noted in Parts I and II that states, provinces,
municipalities, or local populations may sometimes have important interests in a case distinct from those of two governments. Although such
entities or persons obviously have no standing to initiate or pursue proceedings before an arbitral tribunal, paragraph 2 allows the tribunal to
obtain their views where they may be considered necessary by one of the
Parties. On the other hand, the paragraph ensures that, without its consent, a Party's own subdivision or national cannot be brought into the
case.
It is expected that if a request is made by the tribunal to the parties to
arrange for the procuring of evidence or attendance of witnesses, the
party or parties requested will take the necessary steps to ensure the
presentation of such evidence or the attendance of witnesses.
Where use is made of an established tribunal, such as the Chamber of
the Court provided for in Article 3 (b) and (c), that body brings with it its
own statute and rules. Articles 90 to 93 of the Rules of the Court outline
a streamlined procedure to be used by Chambers. These are attached as
Annex D.
The present Article notes once again the preemptive power of a special agreement between the Parties. Paragraph 4 permits the Parties to
request that the Chamber of the Court function in accordance with some
special rules. The power of the Court to make such ad hoc procedures is
found in Articles 31 and 101 of its Rules.
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Article 8: Applicable Law
(1) In deciding any question or dispute submitted to it pursuant to
this Treaty, a tribunal or Chamber shall apply the principles and
rules of international law, especially as reflected in the treaties
and practice of Canada and of the United States, as well as other
relevant principles of substantive law in force in either of the two
countries, particularly those manifesting their common legal traditions.
(2) If a case requires the application of the principles of substantive law in force in either of the two countries, but in the opinion
of the tribunal there exists such a divergence between the relevant
principles in force in Canada and in the United States that it is not
possible to make a final decision on that basis, the tribunal shall
apply such other common legal principles referred to in paragraph
1 as it considers appropriate, having regard to the desire of the
Parties to reach a solution just to all interests concerned.
(3) The Parties may agree on particular principles or rules to be
applied by the tribunal.
Comment. This provision of the law to be applied is somewhat unusual; it is one of the central features of the proposal. An arbitration system designed for the sole use of the two countries presents a unique opportunity for the development of the "North American jurisprudence"
referred to earlier. With a common legal background and many common
rules and practices, it should be possible over time to elaborate a detailed
system of international law which will be addressed to the special problems of North America, and which will eventually avoid or obviate many
disputes. Therefore, this article enjoins the tribunal to look for guidance
to the common principles of the two legal systems, rather than to proceed
deductively from more general universal principles which must accommodate the world's diversity of systems.
It should be understood nevertheless that the basic guide is international law. Reference to the Parties' practice, while it would include
domestic judicial decisions and foreign relations practice, is meant to
cover only common practice. The idea is that when the two countries
both follow a rule of international law on which there is divergence in
international practice, one of them should not be able to refer to this divergent practice of third parties in order to call into question the rule
generally followed by both of them. Where, on the other hand, Canadian
and United States international practices differ, the prime reference
would be to general international law. If an answer cannot be found
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there, the tribunal would turn next to the internal (as distinct from international) practice of the two countries.
Paragraph 2 is modeled on paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Gut Dam
compromis. Considering that there are no international conflict of laws
rules, paragraph 2 provides guidance for the tribunal in cases where there
are irreconcilable differences between applicable domestic laws of the
two countries. Where it is likely that such conflicts will arise in a particular case, the Parties may wish to specify choice of law rules in an ad hoc
agreement. Paragraph 3 makes clear that the Parties themselves are the
ultimate source of law applicable to them. They have the authority even
to agree that no particular law will be applied, that the tribunal should
decide ex aequo et bono. The Group expects, however, that an agreement to this effect would be exceptional.
Article 9: Finality, Binding Force, and Interpretation of Decisions
(1) Subject to Article 10, the decision of a tribunal or Chamber
rendered pursuant to this Treaty is final and binding, and shall be
complied with by both Parties. If the constitutional law of a Party
does not permit or only partly permits a Party's compliance with
the tribunal's decision, or if the necessary legislation has not been
enacted, the Parties agree that the judgment of the tribunal shall
specify pecuniary or other equitable satisfaction for the injured
party.
(2) In the event of disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the
decision, the tribunal or Chamber which rendered it shall construe
it upon the request of either Party.
(3) The tribunal may, either proprio motu or on the request of
one or both of the Parties, correct any manifest technical or clerical error in its judgment.
Comment. Paragraph I of this Article specifies that decisions rendered pursuant to this Treaty bind the Parties to compliance. Although
the first sentence is standard, it is essential, as it gives the system its
mandatory force. The second sentence is a variant of the so-called "Root
Formula," developed with respect to the decisions of the International
Prize Court, and later embodied in Article 32 of the Geneva General Act
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. In some cases, the
tribunal might decide that, for example, a piece of legislation or a domestic judicial decision was contrary to international law. In such a case, the
executive branch might not be able to ensure reversal of a decision or
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enactment of new legislation by another branch of government or by a
political subdivision. This clause, therefore, requires that where a tribunal comes to such a conclusion it will also specify alternative relief, such
as damages.
Departments or branches of government and federal states or provinces are, from the perspective of international law, parts or subdivisions
of the central government. As such, and in accordance with the constitutional provisions of each State, they are bound by the decision in all dealings with the other Party or its subdivisions. If a decision is not complied with, the other Party will have to be given pecuniary or other equitable satisfaction.
The second paragraph of this Article gives either Party the right to
seek clarification of a decision from the tribunal which made it. In the
case of the Chamber of the International Court of Justice, parallel authority is found in Articles 98 and 100 of its Rules. The right to seek such
clarification is a further corollary of the justiciability of treaty interpretation questions. Since the judgment is an intended product of the agreement to arbitrate, and thus in one sense an addendum to that agreement,
it follows that its meaning should be ascertained in the same way as that
of the agreement itself. The third paragraph merely makes clear that the
tribunal has the power to correct any obvious technical or clerical error in
its judgment.
This right to obtain an interpretation does not include the right to
seek revision of the judgment. The entire point of the proposed arbitral
jurisdiction is to provide legal certainty as an aid to dispute settlement.
Revisable judgments would not provide such certainty. The tribunal can,
of course, decide that changed circumstances create a new case, distinguishable from the earlier one, and therefore raising new issues of treaty
interpretation or application. This rubric should be sufficiently flexible
to allow effective reopening of a case in the situation where a "decisive"
fact comes to light only after judgment. In the opinion of the Group, it
would be unnecessary to include the detailed elaboration required to provide expressly for such a situation, which is after all a highly contingent
and speculative possibility. However, if the two Governments were to
decide that such language was desirable, a model may be found in Article 61 of the Statute and Article 99 of the Rules of the Court. Or the
Parties might agree to ask the tribunal to keep a situation under continuous supervision. The court in the Trail Smelter case provided for a possibility of future monitoring.
The Group considered and rejected as well a provision for enforcement of judgments in cases of noncompliance. Although such clauses
are commonly found in arbitral treaties, such a provision was not deemed
necessary in the case of the United States and Canada.
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The Group also did not deem it necessary to include a provision for
the voiding of decisions where the tribunal has exceeded its power or
there has been impropriety within the panel. Since the constitution and
operation of the procedure under the draft Treaty is so fully within the
joint control of the parties, the possibility of such an occurrence would
seem remote indeed. Nevertheless, there are examples of such clauses in
other arbitral or judicial instruments. If the two governments were to
decide that such a safeguard clause should be included, Article 35 of the
International Law Commission's Model Rules of Arbitral Procedure provides an example.
Article 10: Advisory Opinions
In any particular case, the Parties may agree that, instead of a
binding judgment, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with paragraph (a) of Article 3 should render an advisory
opinion.
Comment. This is another important feature of the plan for the settlement of disputes presented in this proposal. It is expected that the
availability of advisory opinions will greatly increase the use of thirdparty procedures in a variety of subject areas, and make it much easier
for the Parties to agree to submit difficult cases to such procedures.
In some cases, the Parties may be unwilling for political or other reasons to give final authority to a tribunal to make a binding decision.
Nevertheless, they might find an advisory opinion in such a case an attractive means of reducing the dimensions of the dispute and of giving
the Parties a basis for reconsideration of their negotiating positions.
Technical, economic, or other non-legal problems may sometimes
involve one or two specific legal questions. The possibility of obtaining
independent advice on such questions could make it easier for negotiators to focus on the technical or other problems central to the dispute. In
such a case, the Parties might wish to agree on streamlined rules of procedure in order to expedite delivery of the opinion.
Questions of treaty interpretation may arise more often in the course
of domestic litigation in one of the States than between the two governments. Obviously, questions arising in this way cannot be submitted to
the compulsory and binding procedure outlined in Articles 1 to 9. However, when the concerned litigants and the domestic court should all desire an authoritative interpretation of the treaty by an international tribunal, and bring the issue to the attention of one of the governments, it may
wish to consult with the other about the possibility of seeking arbitral
advice through the present article. It would, of course, be for each State
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to determine how the pendency of such a question would be brought to
the government's attention and to decide what force the arbitral opinion
would have in the referring court and in its domestic courts generally.
If, after a time, the Parties found this latter form of reference to be
useful, they might wish to come to a general agreement on procedure,
including the possibility of unilateral requests for advice, and the right of
the other Party to intervene. Such a system would require some adjustment in the manner of establishing the tribunal. However, by then the
Parties would have sufficient experience in the appointment of such bodies to guide them in devising the proper procedure.
It should be noted that the advisory procedure provided in Article 10
is available only through ad hoc arbitral tribunals. At present, the Statute
of the International Court of Justice does not permit States to seek advisory opinions directly from the Court or a Chamber, though a procedure
could be devised for obtaining them by utilizing appropriate United Nations channels.
CONCLUSION
The history of the relationship between Canada and the United States
is one of growth: growing economies and political and social systems
have led to growing cooperation and understanding. 49 At the same time,
the relationship has grown in complexity. Canadians and Americans
deal regularly with each other in almost every conceivable area of human
endeavor-whether it be minting, fishing, magazine publishing, or producing nuclear power. Private dealings are carried on constantly, both
between individuals and corporations. Public contracts are also made
increasingly often, and at all levels. The President talks to the Prime
Minister, the Secretary of State to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and competent officials in almost every government department
and agency, both federal and state or provincial, work with their counterparts on the other side of the border.
Various steps are taken by the two countries to avoid disputes. Representatives of each of them do make their views known in the executive,
legislative, and administrative bodies of the governments of the other.
Links are established between various corresponding bodies on either
side of the border. But present efforts are only tentative, and the devices
employed are rudimentary. The two Governments should endeavor to
improve their means of dispute avoidance.
49 The U.S. Census Bureau has been tracking statistics on trade between Canada and
the United States since 1985. We have seen continued growth in trade the past two decades.
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Prior consultation systems could be regularized, and legislative and
regulatory coordination could be improved. The Group has considered
various alternative texts as possible bases for a prior consultation regime.
As might be expected of such an extensive and complicated relationship, numerous disputes do arise, and they are usually settled by the informal, ad hoc process of negotiation. In a small percentage of cases, a
mixed commission is employed as a fact-finding or conciliatory device.
Even this small percentage appears to be overburdening the existing
commission mechanisms. The Group has noted that there may be ways
in which the International Joint Commission and other similar groups
could be restructured to accommodate the increasing load, without endangering the traditions and effectiveness of the original bodies.
A number of the most troubling issues are not settled by negotiations
or by use of mixed commission. What is surprising is that there is presently no binding procedure to which the Untied States or Canada can
refer for a definitive resolution of these otherwise intractable problems.
A few acrimonious disputes can harden attitudes on other questions and
thus threaten the general efficacy of the bilateral system of settlement by
negotiation.
The threads of the relationship are thoroughly interwoven; the fabric
is a whole. If loose ends are left unattended, because negotiations will
not answer, the entire fabric might unravel. Only a system of arbitration
or judicial settlement can, at the least, ensure that these ends will be
bound up. Therefore, the possibility of compulsory reference to arbitration is actually essential to the maintenance of the ad hoc and informal
system of negotiations.
The two Governments must have confidence in each other and faith
in the legal systems of which they offer prime examples. If any two
States in the world should be capable of making law the final arbiter of
differences between them, it is the United States and Canada. With assurance that the necessary mutual trust does exist, the Working Group
recommends that the two Governments should negotiate a Treaty of Arbitration and presents, for discussion purposes, a preliminary draft of
such a treaty.
While it is the Group's belief that compulsory arbitration should
eventually be made available for all legal disputes, it may be advisable to
begin in a more limited fashion. The interpretation and application of
treaties are the most basic of legal issues between States. A definitive
reading of a treaty can often frame and focus a complex political or technical question and lead to a complete settlement by negotiation. Therefore, the Group encourages the Governments to agree at least to compulsory arbitral jurisdiction for these issues.
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The domestic judicial systems of the two countries already offer considerable opportunity for satisfaction of private claims. Still, one country's citizens do not enjoy complete equality of access to the courts of the
other or to remedies available in those courts. It would be equitable to
establish such equality, given the extent and range of transborder contacts. But here again, the Group recognizes that complications-the
countries' federal systems and lack of complete information, among others-may prevent the goal from being achieved all at once. Therefore,
again the Group suggests beginning in a limited area, namely, transfrontier pollution.
If it should prove possible for the two countries to take at least these
two steps, not only would this constitute an important improvement in
the handling of disputes between the two countries but also might serve
as a model for other countries and regions.
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ANNEX A
ALTERNATIVE TEXTS FOR A PRIOR CONSULTATION REGIME
A. 1.

A.2.

A.3.

A.4.

B.1.

B.2.

C. 1.

If either Government should have decided to take any
action which could reasonably be anticipated to have
adverse effects in the other country, it shall notify the
other Government before announcing or proceeding
with such action.
If either Government should be considering the adoption of measures which might adversely affect the
other country, it should consult the other Government
before proceeding with any such measures.
If either Government should be considering the adoption of measures which might adversely affect the
other country, it should notify the other Government
before proceeding with any such measures and, whenever possible, consult with it prior to their implementation.
If either Government should be considering an action
or decision which, if taken, would be likely to have
significant adverse effects in the other country it shall
consult with the other Government prior to making the
decision or proceeding with the action under consideration.
The consultation described above shall be initiated in
a timely fashion so that the Government of the affected country might have a reasonable period in which to
respond.
If a Government should find it impossible to consult
the other before adopting a decision or taking action,
such decision or action should not be applied to the
other country for a six-month period, during which the
Governments should consult about the modalities of
applying the decision or action.
Each Government shall endeavor to ensure that its
federal subdivisions (1) comply with the obligations
of the agreement with respect to decisions and actions
within their jurisdiction and (2) enjoy the benefits of
the agreement when a decision or action is likely to
have adverse effects within their jurisdiction.
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ANNEX B
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
PARIS, 23RD MAY 1977
C(77)28(FINAL)
COUNCIL
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A REGIME OF EQUAL RIGHT
OF ACCESS AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN RELATION TO
TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION
(Adopted by the Council at its 442nd Meeting on 17th May, 1977)
The Council,
Having regard to Article 5(b) of the Convention on the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development of 14th December, 1960;
Having regard to the Declaration on the Human Environment adopted in Stockholm in June 1972 and in particular Principles 21, 22, 23, and
24 of that Declaration;
Having regard to the Recommendations of the Council of 14th November, 1974, on Principles concerning Transfrontier Pollution and of
11th May, 1976, on Equal Right of Access in relation to Transfrontier
Pollution C(74)224 and C(76)55(Final) and without prejudice to such
Recommendations;
Having regard to the Report by the Secretary-General of 18th March,
1977 on the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and
Non-discrimination in relation to Transfrontier Pollution Appendix I to
C(77)287;
Considering that the protection and improvement of the environment
are common objectives of Member countries;
Conscious that pollution originating in the area within the national
jurisdiction of a State may have effects on the environment outside this
jurisdiction;
Considering that the implementation of a regime of equal right of access and non-discrimination among Member countries should lead to
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improved protection of the environment without prejudice to other channels available for the solution of transfrontier pollution problems;
On the proposal of the Environment Committee;
RECOMMENDS that Member countries, in regard to each other,
take into account the principles concerning transfrontier pollution set
forth in the Annex to this Recommendation, which is an integral part of
it, in their domestic legislation, possibly on the basis of reciprocity, notably regarding individual rights, and in bilateral or multilateral international agreements.

ANNEX
INTRODUCTION
This Annex sets out a number of principles intended to promote the
implementation between Member countries of a regime of equal right of
access and non-discrimination in matters of transfrontier pollution, while
maintaining a fair balance of rights and obligations between Countries
concerned by such pollution.
These principles do not prejudice any more favorable measures for
the protection of the environment and of persons whose property, rights,
or interests are or could be affected by pollution the origin of which is
situated within the area under the jurisdiction of a Member country.
For the purposes of this Recommendation:
(a) "Pollution" means any introduction by man, directly or
indirectly, of substance or energy into the environment resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems, impair
amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the environment.
(b) "Domestic pollution" means any intentional or unintentional pollution, the physical origin of which is situated wholly within the area under the national jurisdiction of one Country and which has effects within that area only.
(c) "Transfrontier pollution" means any intentional or unintentional pollution whose physical origin is subject to, and
situated wholly or in part within the area which has effects in
the area under the national jurisdiction of another Country.
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(d) "Country" means any Member country which participates
in this Recommendation.
(e) "Country of origin" means any Country within which,
and subject to the jurisdiction of which, transfrontier pollution originates or could originate in connection with activities
carried on or contemplated in that Country.
(f) "Exposed Country" means any Country affected by transfrontier pollution or exposed to a significant risk of transfrontier pollution.
(g) "Countries concerned" means any Country of origin of
transfrontier pollution and any Country exposed to such pollution.
(h) "Regions concerned by transfrontier pollution" means
any region of origin of transfrontier pollution in the Country
of origin and any regions of the Country of origin and of any
exposed Country where such pollution produces or might
produce its effects.
(i) "Persons" means any natural or legal person, either private or public.
(j) "Regime of environmental protection" means any set of
statutory and administrative measures -related to the protection of the environment, including those concerning the property rights or interests of persons.
TITLE A. PRINCIPLES TO FACILITATE THE SOLUTION AT
INTERSTATE LEVEL OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION
PROBLEMS
(1) When preparing and giving effect to their policies affecting
the environment, Countries should, consistent with their obligations and rights as regards the protection of the environment, take
fully into consideration the effects of such policies on the environment of exposed Countries so as to protect such environment
against transfrontier pollution.
(2) With a view to improved protection of the environment,
Countries should attempt by common agreement to:
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(a) make their environmental policies mutually compatible, particularly those bearing on regions concerned by
transfrontier pollution;
(b) bring closer together quality objectives and environmental standards adopted by Countries, apply them systemically to cases of transfrontier pollution and, where
necessary, improve those already in force;
(c) work out additional rules of conduct of States to be
applied in matters of transfrontier pollution.
(3) (a) Pending the implementation of the objectives laid down
in paragraph 2, and without prejudice to more favorable
measures taken in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above,
each Country should ensure that its regime of environmental
protection does not discriminate between pollution originating from it which affects or is likely to affect the area under
its national jurisdiction and pollution originating from it
which affects or is likely to affect an exposed Country.
(b) Thus, transfrontier pollution problems should be treated by the Country of origin in an equivalent way to similar
domestic pollution problems occurring under comparable
conditions in the Country of origin.
(c) In the event of difficulties arising between Countries
concerned because the situations resulting from transfrontier pollution and domestic pollution are manifestly not
comparable, for example as a result of uncoordinated land
use policies in regions concerned by transfrontier pollution, those countries should strive to arrive at a mutually
agreed arrangement which ensures to the largest extent
possible the application of the principle referred to in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.
TITLE B. LEGAL PROTECTION OF PERSONS
(4) (a) Countries of origin should ensure that any person who
has suffered transfrontier pollution damage or is exposed to a
significant risk of transfrontier pollution shall at least receive
equivalent treatment to that afforded in the Country of origin,
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in cases of domestic pollution and in comparable circumstances, to persons of equivalent condition of status.
(b) From a procedural standpoint, this treatment includes
the right to take part in, or have resort to, all administrative
and judicial procedures existing within the Country of
origin, in order to prevent domestic pollution, to have it
abated and/or to obtain compensation for the damage
caused.
(5) Where in spite of the existence of a liability ceiling instituted
by an international agreement, there exists in a Country a system
of additional compensation financed or administered by the public authorities, then such Country should not be required in the
absence of reciprocal arrangements to grant entitlement to such
additional compensation to victims of transfrontier pollution, but
it should in advance inform the exposed Countries of the particular situation.
(6) (a) Where the domestic law of Countries permits private
non-profit legal persons that are resident within their own territories, such as environmental defense associations, to commence proceedings to safeguard environmental interests
which it is their aim to protect, those Countries should grant
the same right for comparable matters to similar legal persons
resident in exposed Countries, provided that the latter satisfy
the conditions laid down for the former in the Country of
origin.
(b) When some of the conditions concerning matters of
form laid down in the Country of origin cannot reasonably
be imposed on legal persons resident in an exposed Country, these latter should be entitled to commence proceedings in the Country of origin if they satisfy comparable
conditions.
(7) When the law of a Country of origin permits a public authority to participate in administrative or judicial proceedings in order
to safeguard general environmental interests, the Country of
origin should consider, if its legal system allows it, providing, by
means of international agreement if it deems it necessary, competent public authorities of exposed Countries with access to such
proceedings.
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TITLE C. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION
(8) (a) The Country of origin, on its own initiative or at the request of an exposed Country, should communicate to the latter appropriate information concerning it in matters of transfrontier pollution or significant risk of such pollution and enter into consultations with it.50
(b) In order to enable a Country of origin to implement
adequately the principles set out in Title A of this Recommendation, each exposed Country should, on its own initiative or at the request of its Country of origin, supply appropriate information of mutual concern.
(c) Each Country should designate one or more authorities
entitled to receive directly information communicated under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
(9) (a) Countries of origin should take any appropriate measures
to provide persons exposed to a significant risk of transfrontier pollution with sufficient information to enable them to
exercise in a timely manner the rights referred to in this Recommendation. As far as possible, such information should be
equivalent to that provided in the Country of origin in cases
of comparable domestic pollution.
(b) Exposed Countries should designate one or more authorities which will have the duty to receive and the responsibility to disseminate such information within limits
of time compatible with the exercise of existing procedures
in the Country of origin.
(10) Countries should encourage and facilitate regular contacts
between representatives designated by them at regional and/or local levels in order to examine such transfrontier pollution matters
as may arise.

50 The Delegate for Spain reserved his position on the last six words of paragraph

8(a).
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ANNEX C
DRAFT RULES OF ARBITRAL PROCEDURE
The following provisions shall govern the functioning of arbitral tribunals constituted pursuant to the Treaty of Arbitration (the Treaty hereinafter) to which the present Rules are annexed and of which they form
an integral part.
Article 1. Registrars
(1) Within six months of the date of signature of the Treaty the
Government of the United States shall appoint a Registrar sitting in
Washington, and the Government of Canada shall appoint a Registrar
sitting in Ottawa, who shall serve for a term of seven years and may be
reappointed.
(2) Each Registrar shall appoint such supporting officers and staff of
the Registry as may be necessary from time to time, with the approval of
the Parties or of an arbitral tribunal.
(3) The Registrars and the Registries shall perform the functions
specified in the Rules and such other functions as may be assigned to
them from time to time by the Parties or by an arbitral tribunal.
(4) Each Registrar shall primarily serve as the secretary of the arbitral tribunals sitting in the capital where his Registry is situated. The two
Registrars shall cooperate with each other and assist each other to the
extent necessary, including temporary assignments of their officers and
staff to serve in the other capital. Should the volume of cases warrant it,
binational staffs may be established in both capitals with approval of the
Parties.
(5) The appropriate Registrar or Registry shall be available to the
Chamber of the International Court of Justice to be constituted under this
Treaty when sitting in Ottawa or Washington.
Article 2: Remuneration and Expenses
(1) Each member of an arbitral tribunal shall receive a fixed allowance for each day or portion thereof on which he exercises his functions.
(2) The Chairman of a tribunal shall receive a special additional daily allowance.
(3) These allowances shall be fixed from time to time by agreement
of the Parties, taking into account the salaries of judges and chief judges
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of the highest courts in each State. They may not be reduced for the
members of a given tribunal during the period of its functioning.
(4) The salary of the Registrars and any supporting officers and staff
shall be fixed by agreement of the Parties.
(5) Unless the Parties otherwise agree for a particular case, the expenses of each arbitral tribunal shall be borne by the Parties in equal
shares. The administrative expenses of each Registry shall be borne by
the Party in whose capital the Registry is situated.
Article 3: Quorum and Majority for Decision
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall ordinarily function with the presence
of all its members. However, if this proves impossible, a majority of any
arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.
(2) Decisions of a tribunal shall ordinarily be reached by consensus.
Where no consensus can be reached, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of tribunal members present. In the case of an equality of votes,
the Chairman shall have the casting vote.
Article 4: Conduct of Proceedings
(1) An arbitral tribunal shall lay down its own procedure, shall make
orders for the conduct of case before it, shall decide the form and time in
which each Party must present its written pleadings and oral arguments,
and shall make all arrangements connected with the receiving of evidence. In so doing, the tribunal shall assure to each Party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case.
(2) Orders and decisions pursuant to the preceding paragraph shall
be transmitted forthwith by the appropriate Registrar to each Party. The
Registrar shall similarly transmit to both Parties certified copies of all
pleadings and documents submitted pursuant to such orders and decisions, and transcripts of all hearings before the tribunal.
(3) The tribunal, with the consent of the Parties, may appoint such
technical experts or assessors as are considered to the performance of its
duties, on such terms and conditions as it may see fit, subject only to the
availability of funds provided by the two Parties for the expenses of the
tribunal.
(4) Hearings before a tribunal shall be public unless the tribunal
should decide otherwise, on its own initiative or at the request of the Parties.
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Article 5: Default of Appearance
When one of the Parties does not appear before a properly constituted tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other Party may request the
tribunal to continue with the proceedings and to make its decision. Absence or default of a Party shall not be an impediment to the proceedings.
Before making its decision in such a case the tribunal must satisfy itself
not only that it has jurisdiction, but also that the decision is well founded
in fact and law.
Article 6: Judgment
(1) The judgment of an arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject matter of the dispute, and state the reasons on which it is based.
(2) It shall contain the names of the members of the tribunal who
participated in the decision and the date.
(3) Any member of the tribunal may attach a separate or dissenting
opinion to the judgment.
(4) The judgment shall be signed by the Chairman and by the Registrar. It shall be read in open session, due notice having been given by the
Registrar to both Parties. The original of the judgment shall be deposited
in the Registry.
Article 7: Secrecy
The deliberations of the tribunal shall remain secret.
Article 8: Costs
Unless otherwise decided by a tribunal, each Party shall bear its own
costs.
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ANNEX D
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF A CHAMBER
Adopted on 14 April 1978
ARTICLE 16
(1) When the Court decides to form one or more of the Chambers
provided for in Article 26, paragraph 1, of the Statute, it shall determine
the particular category of cases for which each Chamber is formed, the
number of its members, the period for which they will serve, and the date
at which they will enter upon their duties.
(2) The members of the Chambers shall be elected in accordance
with Article 18, paragraph 1, of these Rules from among the Members of
the Court, having regard to any special knowledge, expertise or previous
experience which any of the Members of the Court may have in relation
to the category of the case of the Chamber is being formed to deal with.
(3) The Court may decide upon the dissolution of a Chamber, but
without prejudice to the duty or the Chamber concerned, to finish any
cases pending before it.
ARTICLE 17
(1) A request for the formation of a Chamber to deal with a particular case, as provided for in Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute may be
filed at any time until the closure of the written proceedings. Upon receipt of a request made by one party, the President shall ascertain whether the other party assents.
(2) When the parties have agreed, the President shall ascertain their
views regarding the composition of the Chamber, and shall report to the
Court accordingly. He shall also take such steps as may be necessary to
give effect to the provisions of Article 31, paragraph 4, of the Statute.
(3) When the Court has determined, with the approval of the parties,
the number of its Members who are to constitute the Chamber, it shall
proceed to their election, in accordance with the provisions of Article 18,
paragraph 1, of these Rules. The same procedure shall be followed as
regards the filling of any vacancy that may occur on the Chamber.
(4) Members of a Chamber formed under this Article who have been
replaced, in accordance with Article 13 of the Statute following the expi-
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ration of their terms of office, shall continue to sit in all phases of the
case, whatever the stage it has then reached.
ARTICLE 18
(1) Elections to all Chambers shall take place by secret ballot. The
Members of the Court obtaining the largest number of votes constituting
a majority of the Members of the Court composing it at the time of the
election shall be declared elected. If necessary to fill vacancies, more
than one ballot shall take place, such ballot being limited to the number
of vacancies that remain to be filled.
(2) If a Chamber when formed includes the President or VicePresident of the Court, or both of them, the President or Vice-President,
as the case may be, shall preside over that Chamber. In any other event,
the Chamber shall elect its own president by secret ballot and by a majority of votes of its members. The Member of the Court who, under this
paragraph, presides over the Chamber at the time of its formation shall
continue to preside so long as he remains a member of that Chamber.
(3) The president of a Chamber shall exercise, in relation to cases
being dealt with by that Chamber, all the functions of the President of the
Court in relation to cases before the Court.
(4) If the president of Chamber is prevented from sitting or from acting as president, the function of the presidency shall be assumed by the
member of the Chamber who is the senior in precedence and able to act.
ARTICLE 31
In every case submitted to the Court, the President shall ascertain the
views of the parties with regard to questions of procedure. For this purpose he shall summon the agents of the parties to meet him as soon as
possible after their appointment, and whenever necessary thereafter.
ARTICLE 90
Proceedings before the Chambers mentioned in Articles 16 and 29 of
the Statute shall, subject to the provisions of the Statute and of these
Rules relating specifically to the Chambers, be governed by the provisions of Parts I to III of these Rules applicable in contentious cases before the Court.
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ARTICLE 91
(1) When it is desired that a case should be dealt with by one of the
Chambers which has been formed in pursuance of Article 26 paragraph
1, or Article 29 of the Statute, a request to this effect shall either be made
in the document instituting the proceeding or accompany it. Effect will
be given to the request if the parties are in agreement.
(2) Upon receipt by the Registry of this request, the President of the
Court shall communicate it to the members of the Chamber concerned.
He shall take such steps that may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of Article 31, paragraph 4, of the Statute.
(3) The President of the Court shall convene the Chambers at the
earliest date compatible with the requirements of the procedure.
ARTICLE 92
(1) Written proceedings in a case before a Chamber shall consist of
a single pleading by each side. In proceedings begun by means of an
application, the pleadings shall be delivered within successive time limits. In proceedings begun by the notification of a special agreement, the
pleadings shall be delivered within the same time limits, unless the parties have agreed on successive delivery of their pleadings. The time limits referred to in this paragraph shall be fixed by the Court, or by the
President if the Court is not sitting, in consultation with the Chamber
concerned if it is already constituted.
(2) The Chamber may authorize or direct that further pleadings be
filed if the parties are so agreed, or if the Chamber decides, propio motu
or at the request of one of the parties, that such pleadings are necessary.
(3) Oral proceedings shall take place unless the parties agree to dispense with them, and the Chamber consents. Even when no oral proceedings take place, the Chamber may call upon the parties to supply
information or furnish explanations orally.
ARTICLE 93
Judgments given by a Chamber shall be read at a public sitting of
that Chamber.
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ARTICLE 101
The parties to a case may jointly propose particular modifications or
additions to the rules contained in the present Part (with the exception of
Articles 93 to 97 inclusive), which may be applied by the Court or by a
Chamber if the Court or the Chamber considers them appropriate in the
circumstances of the case.
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